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ABSTRACT

Sandy, Jordan M. M.A., School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State University,
2020.
Chinese Nationalism and the South China Sea.

What role do domestic audiences play in authoritarian policy making? This study examines the
relationship between newspapers and assertive foreign policy. Specifically, this study conducts a
content analysis of state-published newspapers during periods of unprecedented assertiveness in
the South China Sea. Borrowing from Galtung’s theory of peace journalism, this study analyzes
valence patterns used in 99 separate articles published in Xinhua, China Daily, People’s Daily,
and Global Times. Additionally, this study examines the visibility of these articles, to better
understand their prominence in national coverage. This study discusses nationalism in the case of
China, as well as the overwhelming control that its government exerts over domestic access to
information. However, the applicability of this study extends to any authoritarian state,
inherently having significant influence on information availability of its domestic audience.
Finally, this study concludes with a discussion on how these tactics fit in to larger strategic
national goals.
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Chapter 1: Information Access and
Authoritarian States

How do authoritarian states attempt to control domestic access to information regarding

foreign policy? Particularly intriguing is how states manipulate history, patriotism, and
interpretations of world events. This thesis examines how decision making is affected and
supported by nationalism, by employing a case study of the People’s Republic of China.
Authoritarian regimes generally use information control to curb alternative information and
dissent perceived as a power to their rule (Michaelson, 2018). Regimes have historically used
digital technologies to shape public opinion, mobilize supporters, and track emerging grievances;
all to update legitimation strategies and administrative performance (Goebel, 2013; Gunitsky,
2015; MacKinnon, 2011; Morozov, 2011). Specifically, this research explores Beijing’s framing
of foreign policy in the South China Sea (SCS).
The relationship between domestic support and foreign policy in authoritarian states is
already generally accepted in literature (Friedberg, 2015; Swaine, 2010; Zhao, 1997). Accepting
this premise, this thesis examines how domestic support is crafted by governments. If a state can
manipulate the domestic audience in a way that unites opinions at a deeper level, it will
experience much less opposition to assertive foreign policies. The purpose of this research is to
examine Beijing’s portrayal of its interests in the SCS to its domestic audience, as well as the
nationalist rhetoric created in order to increase support for foreign policy. China asserts that it
holds the rights to all of the waters in the SCS, an area disputed with multiple neighboring states.
Since 2009, Beijing has shown increased assertiveness in maintaining this claim through force.
Multiple scholars (Fitzgerald, 1999; Gries, 2004; Johnston, 2013; Friedberg, 2015; Turcsanyi,
2018; and Raditio, 2019) have analyzed China’s behavior in the sphere. In explaining the
1

relationship between domestic access to information and foreign policy, this thesis will also
serve to address their claims.
Security Dilemma
Traditional ideals of realism highlight the relevancy of collective emotions as a source of
nationalistic power (Morgenthau, 1978, 122-6, 168). Morgenthau (1978) introduced the theory of
political realism, a highly contested view of states’ relationships, after the atrocities the world
saw with the two world wars. This perspective was particularly popular and largely supported at
that time, because of the helplessness that was widely felt by survivors of the wars. Political
realism removes aspects of legality and morality in international politics (14). Much later,
opposing theories including liberal institutionalism, critical theory, and constructionism were
presented. This research examines the conditions that political realism sets for how nation states
interact with each other, and how [external] political realism is realized through [internal]
information control.
There is also a distinction to be made between offensive and defensive realism. Taliaferro
(2000) offers that defensive realism provides incentives for expansion only under certain
circumstances. Based largely on the calculations of competing states’ future intentions, a states’
means to increase security decrease the security of others (129). Because of this greater variation
in international expansion, under defensive realism, states ought to pursue moderate strategies as
the best route to security. These two explanations are inherently contradictory visions of the
security dilemma: offensive realism asserts that a security dilemma always generates intense
conflict, while defensive does not. Therefore, according to offensive realism, a state ought to
provoke as soon as strategically viable, as it is an inevitability.
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Neorealism and neoclassical realism are other variants of the realism model. Each explain
phenomena that the other does not, but are complimentary to each other. Neorealism seek to
explain international outcomes—the interaction of 2 or more actors. Also referred to as the
balance-of-power theory (Waltz, 1979, p. 73), neorealism tells us what pressures are exerted and
what possibilities are posed by systems of different structure. Neoclassical realism, on the other
hand, serves to explain why states pursue particular strategies in the international arena
(Taliaferro, 2000, 133). Prominent advocates of neoclassical realism assert that “the impact of
material capabilities sets the parameters of its foreign policy” (134). In other words, the potential
of a states’ affects is directly related to the way a state makes foreign policy decisions. Lobell
(2009) points out that for neoclassical realists, the state is an intervening variable between the
international system and foreign policy (44). This variant of realism contradicts Mearsheimer’s
(2001) argument that “national wealth, population, and the manpower of armies of regional and
potential regional hegemons” are directly linked to foreign policy behavior. However,
neoclassical realism retains Morgenthau’s original essence of realism, while capturing the
domestic factors that influence China’s decision-making.
Organski (1989) describes the essence of the neoclassical argument: the power transition
theory. This model is a version of the realist perspective, however, is fundamentally different in
its assumptions. Namely, “power transition sees the international order not as anarchical at all,
but as hierarchically organized in a manner similar to the domestic political system. Actors
accept their position in the international order and recognize influence based on differences in
the power distribution among nations. This fundamentally different assumption separates power
transition from preceding realist models.” (Organski and Kugler, 1989, p. 172). Power transition
theory argues that “competition for dominance in the international order is finally joined when
3

the dissatisfied party anticipates greater benefits and privileges if a conflict is successfully waged
than if the current status quo is preserved” (Organski and Kugler, 1989, p. 175). In other words,
the dissatisfied [rising] power will challenge the status quo if/when it concludes the ends are
more important that the means.
Though true motivations behind a regime’s decision on whether to become involved in an
international crisis may never be uncovered, it is important to weigh the circumstances
surrounding them to better predict involvement in the future. Diversionary theory studies make
the case that the “rally around the flag” effect inherently makes the tactic reliant on popular
support (DeRouen, 1995, p. 671-95; James and ONeal, 1991, 307-32; Meernik, 2004; Mitchell
and Thies, 2013, 230-60). Tir and Singh (2013) find that administrations enjoy greater public
support in countries that were involved in foreign crises, relative to those that were not (pg. 84).
This, along with the lack of evidence that the public punishes leaders who engage in foreign
crises, creates an incentive structure for a leader facing faltering support to engage in a foreign
crisis (Tir and Singh, 2013, p. 97). However, the diversionary theory is subject to variables
outside of these conclusions, including the economy, type of government, and social factors of
the individual [from which support is gained or lost].
In an authoritarian state, the decision unit usually has the power to determine how a state
is going to respond to a foreign policy issue. Once the leader’s position is known, those with
differing positions generally cease to express them (Hermann, Preston, Korany, & Shaw, 2001,
p. 84). Knowledge about a leader’s reactions to political constraints (domestic, international,
organizational, etc.) can suggest what lies at the heart of a leader’s political agenda (Hermann,
Preston, Korany, & Shaw, 2001, p. 98). In other words, there is a strong correlation between
individual leadership styles and the motivations, scale, and likelihood of foreign policy activities.
4

However, as expressed in realist theories, these individual characteristics are not necessarily
relevant to the outcome of foreign policy goals.
Johnston (1995) defines strategic culture as: an integrated system of symbols (i.e. causal
axioms, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting
strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in
interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious (222). In fact, O’Neill (1999)
argues that symbolism (through honor, social face, prestige, and moral authority) play a profound
role in defining international relations (xi). In cases of international dispute, political game
theory must also be considered. Gain theory is predicated on the idea that people rationally
pursue goals subject to constraints imposed by physical resources and expected behavior
(Meirowitz and McCarty, 2007, p. 6). The war of attrition model follows similar logic. The war
of attrition model, a method of predicting whether state will go to war, asserts that audience costs
are an important factor in weighing risk of war (Fearon, 1994, p. 577). In other words, the
domestic audience is a major factor in considering to wage war.
Assertiveness
There is no scholarly consensus regarding the definition of “assertiveness” in
international relations. Hurrell (2010) defines assertiveness as a constructive activism to
international life. Alternatively, many scholars refer to assertiveness as imperialistic,
nationalistic, or anti-normative behavior (Cox, 2007; Tsygankov, 2008; Migdalovitz, 2010).
Johnston (2013) argues that a much simpler definition can me implied: a form of assertive
diplomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on another actor that are clearly higher than
before (10).
5

Johnston (2013) argues that proponents of the nationalist argument “offer no theory about
how popular sentiments are translated into foreign policy” (37). He offers that in an authoritarian
system, there are no electoral costs to ignoring public opinion. Alternatively, Gries (2004)
highlights the influence that popular nationalist movements play in Chinese foreign policy (134).
Swaine and Tellis’ (2000) “calculative” model offer the most comprehensive explanation for
Chinese aggressiveness. This model, largely aligned with realism, argues that China is a rational
actor that has strategically chosen assertive calculations (xi.).
Forming Public Opinion
According to Shannon’s (1993) information theory, the signals from the decision makers
are encoded into messages and conveyed by the media to reach the domestic and international
audience, or information sink, after decoding (p. 212). The information sink then gives
appropriate feedback through praise or protest. Lei and Mengli (2014) assert that the encoding
and conveyance of the media are critical, as they determine the premise of the correct decoding,
which signals the information sink receives, and thus the corresponding feedback (p. 96). In
other words, the media is the most important channel for the dissemination of information, as it
naturally plays a pivotal role in the settlement of international disputes (Lei and Mengli, 2014, p.
97).
Entman (2007) defines framing as an omnipresent process in politics and policy analysis.
It involves “selecting a few aspects of a perceived reality and connecting them together in a
narrative that promotes a particular interpretation”. Frames can function in up to four ways:
define problems, specify causes, convey moral assessments, and endorse remedies. Frames
introduces or enhance the availability and apparent importance of certain ideas for evaluating a
political object (Entman, 2010). In order to be successful, frames must “call to mind” congruent
6

elements of schemas that were stored in the past. Fiske and Taylor (1991) define schemas as
“cognitive structures that represent knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its
attributes and the relations among attributes” (131). Schemas fit new perceptions to an existing
organization of knowledge. Therefore, prior knowledge allows the reader to make sense of new
information (consciously or not) by deciding how the new material fits into their understanding
and feelings of the world (Entman, 2010).
Agenda building typically focuses on the degree of issue salience correspondence
between the media and the public (McCombs, 1993). Agenda building examines the transfer of
salience between the news media and audiences, usually from a particular interest group or group
of elites, to the news media and subsequently to the public (Kim and Kiousis, 2012). Building
upon this, second-level agenda-setting examines attribute salience as a component of the agendabuilding process. Previous research in second-level agenda setting indicates that news media
highlight certain aspects of objects while simultaneously ignoring others to “help stakeholders
develop an understanding about objects” (Coleman and Wu, 2010; Fahmy, Wanta, and Nisbet,
2012; Wanta, Golan, and Lee, 2004). There are two types of attribute saliency that agendabuilding research examines: substantive and affective attributes. Substantive attributes refer to
personality traits linked to a news object (Golan and Wanta, 200l; McCombs et al., 1997), while
affective attributes refer to the overall tone of news coverage: negative, neutral, or positive
(Shaefer, 2007; Takeshita, 2006).
Countless governments take active measures in attempting to shape global narrative
regarding both their leaders and their foreign policies (Cheng, Golan, and Kiousis, 2016, p. 747).
Literature on mediated public diplomacy has identified an array of tactics aimed at shaping
global media frames through native advertising (Golan and Viatchaninova 2013), op-eds (Golan
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2013), television and print advertising (Fullerton and Kendrick 2013), social media platforms
(Hayden 2011; Zhang 2013), and government-sponsored satellite channels (Fahmy, Wanta, and
Nisbet 2012; Powers and Yousmans 2012; Samuel-Azran 2013). These approaches have proven
critical for states to maintain preferred domestic narratives. In fact, Manheim and Albritton
(1983) found that states that received public relations counsel were able to improve their
visibility and valence in news content (pg #).
Nationalism
Nationalism is closely related to the “interest of the state” and features a unique loyalty to
the national government (Chen, 2004, p. 31). Wei and Liu (2002) argue that as European
nationalism is generally associated with a strong pride and even racism against the “other”
(foreigners), and Chinese nationalism similarly surfaced as a Han-oriented chauvinism (9).
Cheng (2019) highlights this correlation between racism and nationalism: Chinese patriotism is
not just about defending the nation, but also protecting the race (6). Nationalism generally refers
to one’s support for their nation, which includes national image (Gries, 2004, p. 9), an emotional
significance to standing in the international community (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255), and any behavior
designed to “restore, maintain, or advance” public image of said nation (Greenfield, 1992, p. 3).
Kedourie (1961) notes that a state can only become great in proportion to its population and the
prosperity of its people. Therefore, the cohesion of the state, and its subsequent loyalty, depend
on the state’s capacity to ensure said welfare (11-2). This dependence also includes the state’s
perceived capacity to provide for its people: regardless of substantiated effectiveness.
There are four general entities associated with a nation (Wang, 2003, p. 6). These very
unique conditions help to shape the definition of a nation. First, an ethnic group of a common
decent. Very basically, the ethnicity from which one is born. Although many analysts of
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domestic sovereignty are concerned with how the individual is connected with the larger group
(Elmer, 2008; Greimanm 2010), Zuck (2016) argues that a written constitution also plays a factor
on sovereignty: political rather than racial ties (8, 28).
Next is the consideration of one’s cultural community. This historical heritage is the
essence of a nation. It is defined as a distinctive civilization embodied in common patterns of
language, customs, norms behavior, myths, and symbols. This definition of a nation is more
inclusive than the first, as those with external ethnic origins can also participate. Grimm and
Cooper (2015) first discusses “popular sovereignty”: sovereignty lies within, and cannot be
transferred from, the people (Grimm and Cooper, 2015, p. 40). Grimm describes popular
sovereignty with the creation of the U.S. in mind. He details the intricacies involved with
sovereignty after the federation was created and separated from England: “who owns the
sovereignty that no longer belonged to England?” (36) The short answer is that the federal
parliament did. The people (and individual states) retained their voice and will through the vote
but the sovereignty of this new nation belonged to the federal Congress. The constitution,
emulating from the people, existed as a “regulator between the [government] and the [people]
and thus preserves their popular sovereignty” (Grimm and Cooper, 2015, p. 37).
Third is the sovereign state condition. This concept is based on the territorial and legal
dimensions of a nation. Those living in the same territorial-political-legal unit are considered
belonging to the nation, regardless of their ethnic or cultural background. Marsonet (2017)
argues that although national sovereignty has largely become old-fashioned, it will long remain
one of the “most important principle in international affairs” (40-1). She describes the more
common ideas of supranational, national, and subnational sovereignty (40). She contends, as a
supranational argument, that post-war tendency is for states to delegate at least part of their
9

sovereignty to world international organizations (41). What is not taken seriously in this
argument are specific events. This argument addresses international relations as a theory, but
states’ relationships (case-based or regionally) are derived from their individual national
sovereignty. Unless acted upon, by a supranational institution, states’ actions are their own
(Milward, 1993, p. 9).
The fourth and final condition for a nation is a non-exclusive free association of citizens
held together by a liberal popular culture. Habermas (1999) asserts that this collection of
citizenry is crystallized around a set of “abstract procedures and principles”, therefore allowing
an alternative focus of loyalty. This civic model of a nation is sustained by an agreement of its
members, typically through a political creed, and without regard for descent, race, ethnic, or
cultural backgrounds (Spencer & Wollman, 2002, p. 101). This U.S. is frequently cited as an
example of the civic model, as a “non-national” nation (Wang, 2003, p. 4).
Information Control
In a study of how censorship is employed during the rise of nationalism, Cairns and
Carlson (2012) found that states use social media to highlight the public opinions that best fit the
official narrative, particularly during times of crisis (28). In their specific case study, China used
social media, along with official state messages, to manipulate protests and event circumstances
to support party objectives (40). This use of information control is critical to maintaining
patriotism and party support when it otherwise may not be. Unfortunately, ‘no scholarly
consensus about the eﬀect of new media on politics in authoritarian regimes’ (Bulovsky, 2019,
23). However, Downs (1957), assuming states are rational actors, has created 2 categories for
describing how political leaders use social media: uni-directional and multi-directional
communication. Uni-directional projects opinions with little interaction in the other direction.
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Multi-directional describes an open and circular flow of discourse, with engagements of
opposing opinions (135-150). Bulovsky’s research theorizes that autocratic leaders exhibit unidirectional tendencies which makes them less present, less willing to engage, and less willing to
listen (25).
In a more practical sense, an individual’s freedom, or self-realization, lies in their identity
with the whole; a sense of belonging to a larger society. A state positions itself in a unique
situation, where it serves to fulfill this inherit sense of individual belonging. In this sense, as the
state serves the interests of a collection of individuals, the state can more easily be placed
“higher” than the individual (Kedourie, 1961, p. 38). Kedourie argues that the state serves as the
creator of one’s freedom in an internal and spiritual sense, not just in the material sense (47);
individual freedoms only have meaning in the collective being (82). Kedourie explains that
nationalist doctrine, language, race, and culture all combine to create the [perceived] common
entity: the nation (73).
A state employs information control for official and unofficial reasons. Officially, a state
can claim that information n control is a public service; an average citizen cannot adequately
discern which information is factual. A state may also argue that, for reasons of national cultural
stability, it must take these efforts to ensure its citizens’ patriotic commitment to their heritage.
More accurately, unofficially, a state employs information control tactics as a means to control
the narrative to ensure domestic support. If a state controls every aspect of information that its
citizenry has available, gaining and maintaining domestic support becomes that much easier
(Widmer, 1961, p. 39-61).
We must consider how the use of censorship fits into the national goals of a developing
nation. The use of censorship and information control has long been used by authoritarian
11

governments to manipulate public opinion. Defining censorship is quite complex; however, to
borrow ideas from Widmer (1961), it is a clash between public and private opinions (39).
Therefore, in order to study censorship, we must examine approved and “unofficial” writings on
specific topics in history. Widmer examines historical arguments for and against the employment
of censorship in a broader sense, notably whether propaganda can reasonably be self-censored by
an “average” person. Tiffert (2019) argues that information control, specifically through digital
platforms, offer dynamic mastery over citizens’ memory and identity (554).
More recently, autocratic states have increasingly utilized technological advances for
their benefit. Social media, websites, cell phones, satellite television, radio, and newspapers have
all been used as catalysts in support of regime rhetoric (Edmond, 2013, 1422). Edmond (2013)
developed a model of predicting how information control affects autocratic regimes (1423). It
predicts that as news sources are more centralized, the likelihood of a regime’s survival
increases. In other words, as the number of available sources of information increases, the
regime is easier to overthrow (1423). This fact alone gives us a better understanding of why
authoritarian states have such an interest to maintain complete control over available news
sources.
Galtung (2003) proposed the idea of peace journalism to describe the framing of stories
of conflict and highlight the peaceful nature of initiatives. This idea is the counter to war
journalism, which is elite-oriented and focuses on the here and now. War journalism reports
about the who, what, where, and when of a conflict, and neglect the factors that contributes to
them. Because of this stark distinction between facts, it advocates a “them vs. us" mentality, and
only exposes atrocities of the “other side” (Tehranian, 2002). Peace journalism, alternatively,
provides the necessary context to the structural and cultural processes surrounding the conflict
12

(Lynch and McGoldrick, 2007). Multiple scholars found that war and peace journalism is
supported by the framing theory: “construct of a communication – its language, visual and
messengers – and the way it signals to the listener or observer how to interpret and classify new
information” (258).
Manheim (1994) found that news framing analyses usually cover three aspects: visibility,
valence, and frame genres. Visibility refers to both the amount of coverage and the prominence
level of an event/issue or a nation receives in the news coverage. Prominence is usually
demonstrated by certain typical elements such as the article’s placement in the newspaper or web
sites, the headline, the visual tools associating with the text, the mention on the evening
television news etc. Valence or slant is the tone of a news story or comment regarding certain
frames. It is believed to have the potential to generate behavioral effects. Entman (2007) also
stressed that agenda setting, priming and framing fit together as tools of power, and he connected
them to explicit definitions of news slant and bias.
Brewer, Graf, & Willnat (2003) found that framing on mass media can significantly
influence an individual’s perception of social reality. Xie (2020) defines frames as “basic
cognitive structures which guide the perception and representation of reality (44). Gitlin (1980)
expands framing in include a more deliberate shaping of a perceived reality. Gitlin argues that
framing is the “persistent selection, emphasis, and exclusion” of events and issues by mass
media. The effect, then, is a systematically constructed narrative created by suppressing details
and elaborating certain elements of rhetoric.
For a more strategic vantagepoint of news framing, many scholars look to “episodic
framing” and “thematic framing” (De Vreese, 2014; Holton, Lee & Coleman, 2014; Kim, 2015).
“Episodic” frames focus on individual cases and encourage an audience to make internal
13

attributions for events (Iyengar, 1996, p. 62). Contrarily, “thematic” frames focus more on
broader social issues, such as social, political, and economic forces; these frames encourage
viewers to make external attributions (Iyengar, 1996, p. 62). Episodic framing descries concrete
events that illustrate issues, while thematic framing presents collective or general evidence
(Yang and Heng, 2019).
Cohen (1963) argues that media exert little sway over “what people think,” yet are
“stunningly successful” in telling them “what to think about” (13). Nagel (1975) argues that
power is the ability to get others to act as one wants. Inducing people to think as desired requires
elites to select exactly which information the public should know. Outside of coercion,
embedding cues on how this media-shaped narrative coheres with prior attitudes and beliefs, is
the ideal method of framing (392). Though Entman (2010) researches this method on
democracies, this framing technique could just as easily, if not more easily, be applied to
autocratic states.
Yang and Heng (2019) conducted a content analysis s of news articles from The Star, the
largest circulation in Malaysia. The research analyzed three years (2014-2016) of content of
coverage of the SCS. These were key dates to consider, as many events took place during this
period that both positively and negatively affected the Chinese-Malaysian relationship. Events
included the “Malaysia-China Friendship Year”, an outspoken Chinese foreign ambassador to
Malaysia, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration's (PCA) ruling that China had no historic
rights to the SCS. The study aimed to examine the reporting of the SCS by The Star, specifically
in the theoretical context of war/peace journalism and framing (17-22). The study coded for the
three aspects of framing (visibility, valence, and frame genres) and coded for eight different
categories to separate war/peace journalism. The study found that indicators of war journalism
14

were nearly 40% more than indicators of peace journalism. In fact, Lee and Maslog (2005) found
similar evidence of four Asian conflicts that were dominated by war journalism.
Yang and Heng (2019) found that the most salient indicators of The Star’s coverage of
the SCS were “elite-oriented”, “difference-oriented”, and “focuses on here and now” (30).
Francis (2002) asserts that when editors and reporters inform readers about the “who, what,
when, where, why, and how” relating to conflicts, they are also corresponding to what peace
researchers call “conflict dynamics” (28). In order to be considered peace journalism, the piece
should identify “its history, recent causes, and internal composition—the different parties, the
nature of their involvement, their perspectives, positions and motivations, and the different
relationships between them in terms of power, allegiance and interests” (Francis, 2002). In other
words, increasing not only the number of sources, but also the amount of context, decreases the
assertiveness of a news piece.
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Expected Findings
1. Increased domestic intellectual constraints affect adaptation of foreign policy (Zhao, 1997).
Authoritarian regimes generally use information control to curb alternative information and
dissent perceived as a power to their rule (Michaelson, 2018). Regimes have historically used
digital technologies to shape public opinion, mobilize supporters, and track emerging grievances;
all to update legitimation strategies and administrative performance (Goebel, 2013; Gunitsky,
2015; MacKinnon, 2011; Morozov, 2011). Because Beijing identifies the SCS is identified as a
core interest (U.S. State Department, 2010), it will utilize information control tactics to rally
support for more assertive foreign policies in the SCS.
2. Realism best explains foreign policy aggressiveness. China’s only near-peer competitor in the
region is the U.S. (based on definition from Szayna et al., 2001) The debate over maritime
disputes is the primary factor keeping the U.S. “looming” over Chinese politics (with the
exception of Taiwan) (Haass, 2019). Demonstrating a defensive, persecuted role, China could
potentially win the favor of the international community; driving out the U.S. and leaving a
power vacuum for China to fill as the untested regional superpower.
3. China frames newspaper content in a way that positively reflects its zero-sum solution to SCS
disputes. The framing of nationally sensitive issues is strictly controlled, as the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) sends notices to all the newsrooms, gives direction on framing, and
orders reprint articles from party mouthpieces (Kuang, 2014). Kuang and Wei (2018) find that
the autonomy of the news organizations in non-democracies, such as China, to frame political
issues largely depends on the geographic relevance of the issue due to the scope of the control
exerted by the propaganda authorities.
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Methodology
The purpose of this research is to discuss the relationship between newspaper framing
and assertive foreign policy. Specifically, this research analyzes newspapers published by statesponsored Chinese media sources. The newspapers collected were published between 2011 and
2016, a period of Chinese assertive behavior that Tyrcanyi (2018) describes as unequivocal (43,
53). This time period was selected to address Johnston’s (2013) assertion that People’s Republic
of China (PRC) actions are neither new nor assertive. In fact, Johnston (2016) suggests that
Chinese nationalism, and the affect that it has on diversionary conflict, has decreased since 2009
(9). Turcsányi (2018) highlights that little objective analysis has been conducted on Chinese
behavior after 2011, from the perspective of the ‘assertiveness’ concept (11). This newspaper
content analysis serves to measure the way in which Chinese media attempts to portray its
assertive actions in the SCS.
China is ruled by a one-party authoritarian regime that is determined to retain its
exclusive grip on political power (Friedberg, 2018, p. 17). China’s rulers clearly believe the
ideological realm to be a crucially important domain of competition. Beijing’s obsessive desire
to squelch dissent, block the inward flow of unfavorable news bespeaks an insecurity that is, in
itself, a form of strategic vulnerability (Friedberg, 2018, p. 9). Tsang (2019) argues that Xi
Jinping seeks to reclaim China’s place as the most magnificent great power in the world (p. 306).
This task is to be achieved by pursuing the China Dream of national rejuvenation, which can
only be secured by adhering closely to the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC)
(Xinhua, 2018).
Never forget why you started, and you can accomplish your mission. The original
aspiration and the mission of Chinese Communists is to seek happiness for the Chinese
people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation. This original aspiration, this mission, is
what inspires Chinese Communists to advance. In our Party, each and every one of us
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must always breathe the same breath as the people, share the same future, and stay truly
connected to them. The aspirations of the people to live a better life must always be the
focus of our efforts. We must keep on striving with endless energy toward the great goal
of national rejuvenation. (Jinping, 2017)
Specifically, this analysis follows Yang and Heng’s (2019) study of a Malaysian
newspaper framing of SCS incidents, this research analyzes newspapers from 99 newspapers
from state-sponsored sources, including China Daily, People’s Daily, Xinhua, and Global Times.
Each of the newspapers were identified as fitting into one or multiple indicators of peace and/or
war journalism. The time frame after the event took place was also considered, giving better
insight in to how Chinese media presents information to its domestic audience. As Johnston
(2004) found very little systematic research on Chinese nationalism, except a few rare cases, this
research attempts to significantly fill that gap. The presence of war journalism indicators offer
insight into framing approaches, and preferred valence usage, all the way from CCP leadership to
individual newspaper agencies.
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Chapter 2: Nationalism and Information
Control in China
Information Control
For thousands of years, Chinese rulers have utilized the manipulation of language as a
tool to legitimate their rule (Gries, 2004, p. 9). Historical allegory is just another tool aimed at
maintaining unity, pride, and unwavering support for the CCP. China is now attempting to build
an internet that is big enough to support its rapid-growing economy, while at the same time
maintain enough control to ensure its power monopoly (Petley, 2009, p. 101). It does so through
its 30,000 internet police officers and 12 separate government departments with authority over
the internet. China also built the “Great Firewall of China”, the world’s most sophisticated
information barrier, which acts as a gatekeeper for all information entering and leaving China.
This ensures all available information originates from or is filtered through the Communist Party
of China. Western companies like Yahoo, Microsoft, and Google all operate in China, but use
specifically designed Chinese versions of their products that conform to these regulations. For
example, Microsoft admitted to automatically blocking “sensitive content” such as any mention
of “freedom” or “democracy” (107-8).
The CCP values the power of internet controls, especially those of current events and
political discussion. It is evident that the CCP is specifically interested in threats to regime
legitimacy, political stability, or national image (Tang, 2005, p. 82). However, recently Beijing
has begun to loosen the grip on media control (AP, 2003). Based on a compilation of newspapers
and magazine sources, government criticisms continue to surface past government controls
(Tang, 2005, p. 84). This suggests that China is attempting to appeal to the domestic base by
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highlighting its role as more of a “supervisor” of information, rather than a gatekeeper. The
interactions between the Chinese people and the CCP are crucial and central to nationalist
politics. Legitimacy relies on implanted strategies, and how they evolve over time.
Chinese media discourse is different than Western media discourse due to China’s unique
social system and political economy (Zhang, 2014, p. 1). Where Western media has archived
independence through commercialization, the CCP has reinforced its control of the media
through commercialization. As China has shifted from isolation to a global economic power, its
news media has a major influence over the changing society and itself is quickly changing.
Taubman (1998) highlights the importance of regulation of information and ideas to regime
security (p. 258). The better equipped governments are to preserve political stability and quell
potential disconnect with the polity, the better its chances at survival. However, particularly with
nondemocratic states, such benefit is compromised when societal actors acquire the capacity to
breach the state’s monopoly on information and alternative ideology. The CCP has been more
than successful at sustaining this monopoly. As Lee (2018) points out:
…most Chinese people still adhere to the imaginary the rulers have imposed, through
ideology and economic inducement—despite the failure, so far, of this officially
projected imaginary to provide individual and societal autonomy, or even the most basic
political rights…[including] the creation of an underclass of ex-peasant migrant workers
deprived of full-socio-economic rights, the failure to address the political claims of ethnic
minorities…and the lack of political rights for all of China’s citizens. (p. 39)

The CCP was driven by humiliations of sufferings brought by the West, to mend and
rejuvenate the [image of] the Chinese nation (Wei and Liu, 2002, p. 77). The CCP has made
evident their [authoritarian] stance: a strong centralized state is the preferred prerequisite for a
stronger China (Zhao, 2013, pp. 725-45). Chen determined that strong nationalism among the
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Chinese people are rooted in two main sources: the government’s promotion of strengthening
legitimacy, and the public’s yearning for a stronger national identity (107). In fact, this
increasing national sentiment is evident multiple surveys regarding Beijing’s role in Asia and the
world (107). Interestingly, Chen also finds a correlation between strong nationalist sentiment and
diffuse support (108). In other words, Chinese people are willing to sacrifice democratization for
sociopolitical “stability” under the authoritarian regime.
Wang (2012) notes a strong relationship between culture and politics (230). China has
worked relentlessly, through its “patriotic education”, introduced at a young age. This patriotic
education is key to creating a sense of deep culture of national history and collective historic
memory. Creating this subconscious, shared narrative at a young age is key to easily
manipulating a rhetoric that supports future foreign policy issues. More precisely, “deep culture
remains dormant until confronted with a need to interact” (Wang, 2012, p. 230). To be clear, the
emergence of nationalism in China was not a grassroots movement (Wang, 2012, p. 75). This
was a strategic, long-term technique beginning at the turn of the century (Wang, 2012, p. 77),
based largely on creating feelings of national humiliation, adverting blame for suffering, and
blind patriotism.
Podeh (2000) argues that forging a nation’s collective memory is integral to nation
building. Creating said link between history and memory is key to implanting knowledge and
values in the younger generation (65). She continues that in this sense, the educational system is
another arm of the state that acts to ensure a very particular version of historic collective
memory. Mehlinger (1985) even refers to school textbooks as modern “village storytellers”; they
are responsible for conveying to youth what they should know about their own culture, as well as
other societies (287). Bar-Tal offers that this manipulation of the past creates a deep worldview
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of prejudice and stereotyping in describing the “other” (170), or all those that oppose said created
collective memory. Kedourie (1961) explains that education must have a central position in
nationalist states; schools are instruments of state policy, much like the army or police (83-4).
The “Century of Humiliation” (百年耻辱), also known as Century of National Shame, is
central to national narrative of Chinese nationalism (Gries, 2004, p. 46). Kedourie (1961) argues
that nationalists “make use of the past in order to subvert the present” (70). In other words, the
present determines the past. This idea is central to understanding how the CCP uses the past to
shape nationalistic rhetoric and patriotic world-views. The Century of Humiliation is
fundamental to Chinese views of the world, and is continuously reworked to the evolving
meaning of what it means to be Chinese (Gries, 2004, p. 46). In this way, the CCP can highlight
“humiliations” of the past to fit whichever narrative it is pursuing at that time. Major conflicts
repeatedly referred to include the two Opium Wars, the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion,
and the “War of Resistance against Japan” (Second Sino-Japanese War) (47).
The Chinese patriotic education campaign, launched shortly after the Tiananmen
Incident, was one of many wide-scale attempts at ideological reeducation (Wang, 2012, p. 96).
The CCP’s response to the challenges of belief and regime legitimacy was the implementation of
this reeducation campaign. To counter democratic and other civic protests, nationalism was
cultivated to provide a “common foundation for public consent” (Ching, 1996, p. 34) [of the
authoritarian values of the CCP]. The major goal of the campaign was to ensure that [younger]
Chinese people were thoroughly aware of the “humiliating experience in the face of Western and
Japanese incursions” and the triumphs of the CCP revolution leading to national independence
(97). All aspects of Chinese education, from kindergarten to university level, were to center on a
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narrative that emphasized the “bullying and humiliation” of Chinese people under foreign
powers. This particular interpretation strengthened CCP legitimacy by emphasizing its role in
revolution and sacrifice that prevented a weak and divided China (98).
Yang (2017) found that China’s internet censorship regime has been refined in response
to changing platforms of online expression (p. 1946). At the center of these new forms of
censorship is a set of discourses of “civility” and “civilization”. Captured under the Chinese term
wenming (文明), both are used to demobilize online activism by attacking its emotional and
allegedly irrational behavior. As civilization, wenming operates as an ideological discourse that
legitimates the governance and administration of society. As civility, it functions as a strategic
technology and tool for governance and self-governance, including the governance of the
Internet (Yang, 2017, p. 1946). Curiously, the term wenming has a Chinese history and political
context, the discourses of civility and civilization have a longer and global history associated
with nation building, colonialism, and the development of the modern individual (Duara, 2001;
Elias, 1939/2000; G. W. Gong, 1984). Yang asserts that conditioning the individual of the
undesirable connotations surrounding incivility is precisely what turns Chinese citizens into
supporters of the official language of civility. Therefore, encouraging civility enhances the
legitimacy of official discourse (Yang, 2017, p. 1946).
Outside of manipulation from official sources, the CCP also employs a veritable army of
internet commentators to sing government’s praises and attack its critics. A Harvard University
team carried out an empirical study on the 50 Cent (50c) Party, finding about 488 million social
media comments per year aimed to deflect public criticism (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017, p. 485).
Waddell (2017) found that these paid government “trolls” commonly utilize the distraction
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method of online censorship. The 50c party is mostly composed of government employees
contributing part time outside of their regular jobs, with a smaller proportion composed of
ordinary citizens paid piecemeal for their work (King, Pan, and Roberts, 2017, p. 497) In April
2014, President Xi Jinping visited Xinjiang, where he promised to ramp up the government’s
response to terrorism. Shortly after the visit, an attack on the Urumqi railway station (in
Xinjiang) killed three people and injured dozens more. Immediately following the attack,
searches for “Urumqi blast” were blocked on Baidu and Sina Weibo (large search engine and
social media platforms), and more than 3,000 posts were made on various social networks.
Curiously, none of the posts praised the Xi regime. Rather, they praised China’s good
governance, economic opportunities, and the “mass line” (Waddell, 2017). King, Pan, and
Roberts (2017) find eight similar “event-distraction” cases between 2013-2014 alone (pg. 488).
CCP authorities control the framing of a nationally sensitive issue by ordering news
organizations to use the news articles produced by state news agencies only when they want to
report an issue (Kuang and Wei, 2018, p. 1436). It is unclear exactly which frames are
consistent with the government stance (Kuang and Wei, 2018, p. 1436), but the geographic
relevance of a sensitive news issue (and subsequent political control) is believed to influence
how the issue is framed (Kuang, 2014). Those issues deemed “nationally sensitive” are ordered
to be trans-printed from state news agencies, and according to CCP guidelines (Feng et al., 2012;
Ma, 2005; Wu, 2006). The CCP has overwhelming control over the media’s framing base. In
fact, Zhang and Fleming (2005) found that the CCP controls media coverage in three ways: the
propaganda department appointing the editors in-chief at the respective newspapers, the
propaganda department issuing directives or circulars at various levels, and top government
officials disseminating direct instructions in their talks or speeches at certain meetings (313-339).
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The link between civilizing the Internet and national security is neither new nor specific
to China (Dauvergne & LeBaron, 2014). Civilizing, in this context, refers to the “purification of
the cultural environment on the Internet” (People’s Daily, 2009). Yang (2017) finds two recent
developments that link the civilization of the Internet and national security (p. 1951). First, the
2013 Snowden incident, where a classified information about surveillance programs run by the
U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), brought light to a corporate-state surveillance apparatus
(Giroux, 2015). Following the incident, Chinese discourse gained a new moral persuasion among
the Chinese population; specifically, it gave Chinese nationalists new leverage for controlling
online information flows under the guise of national security (Yang, 2017, p. 1951). Second, the
Chinese Cybersecurity Law was passed in 2017 to consolidate and strengthen the CCP’s control
over information controls in the Internet. The growing use of national security in Chinese
Internet governance shows that increasingly, the Chinese government is invoking the global
discourse of securitization to legitimate Internet censorship and surveillance (Deibert and
Rohozinski, 2008).
News sources
The Xinhua News Agency is one of the most influential propaganda apparatuses of the
CCP. Xinhua has developed a nationwide network for news collection and distribution (Xin,
2012, p. 20). Even before the foundation of the PRC, Xinhua was responsible for creating and
managing the CCP’s newspapers. Xinhua officially became the only legitimate national news
agency in 1949, with three specific missions: to present the voice of the government, to
implement centralized control over its branches to maintain a unitary tone, and to guide domestic
news organizations to follow CCP principles. As subordinate newspapers were critiqued based
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on Xinhua’s acceptance of their stories, they were compelled to publish Xinhua’s exclusive
reports on politically sensitive issues (Xin, 2006, p. 48-9).
Lynch (1999) highlights the tensions between Xinhua and local newspapers (pg. 160). As
Xinhua monopolized the provision of cross-regional and international news prior to the Cultural
Revolution (1966-76), local newspapers and radio stations had limited autonomy in selecting
news of local happenings. Instead, they were forced to use Xinhua’s reports about outside
regions (Lynch, 1999, p. 160). This tension was largely caused by Xinhua’s neglect and
devaluation of local press, as it saw “central newspapers” (i.e. People’s Daily) as of more
importance and power (Guo, 1997, 61-9). For Xinhua journalists, the political effect of a news
story was determined by the number of newspapers that published the item without editing it
(Guo, 1997, p. 51– b 60).
The late 1990s brought a noticeable period of globalization of Chinese culture, as China
began to develop as a market economy (Xin, 2006, p. 53). Chinese news organizations,
particularly Xinhua and People’s Daily, had to face the unavoidable processes of marketization,
which impacted the relationship between the two. First, an unprecedented media boom, resulting
in an increase in the number of titles of newspapers published in China from 69 in 1979 (Lee,
2000, p. 47) to 2137 in 2002 (ZGXWNJS, 2003, p. 63). Second, Xinhua and newspaper
organizations became only party government supported. By the end of 1994, the majority of
national and provincial Party newspapers operated with reduced subsidies from the government,
forcing them to seek other revenue sources (Tang, 2003, p. 113). Third, main media concepts
were redefined. Among Chinese academics, the notion of media as a combination of a
propaganda tool and a means to inform became more popular (He, 2002, p. 8). Traditional news
agencies, such as Xinhua, face the theoretical challenge of legitimizing themselves as news
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agencies or wholesalers. However, as a receiver of government subsidies, Xinhua’s credibility
and competitiveness is damaged in the increasingly globalized information market (International
Communication Conference, 2011, p. 10)
Apart from Reference News, most Xinhua publications were launched in the 1980s and
1990s (Xinhua, 2000), after failed Xinhua business ventures outside of reporting (Cai, 1999, p.
86-9). In the late 1980s, Xinhua became a mixture of wholesaler and retailer of news, distinct
from its traditional mixture of agency and newspaper operations since its conception. Local
newspapers offered Xinhua access to mass readership, bringing in a considerable amount of
advertising revenue (Xin, 2006, p. 52). However, from 2002 to 2006, Xinhua closed a number of
nonprofitable business enterprises and gradually separated its news and information marketing
from its editorial pieces. Xinhua 08 was launched in 2007, which provided five new types of
services: real time information, real time data, economic data, financial models and trading
platform. The purpose of this new platform was to attract non-media clients, governmental
regulatory agencies, and those individuals that would otherwise utilize Bloomberg or Reuters
(Wu, 2007).
Xinhua also offers TV news services. Beginning as a small-scale production in the early
1990s, China Xinhua News Network Corporation (CNC) works closely with local satellite TV
stations to provide Chinese and English-language news television (Xinhua, 2009). As a part of
the CCP’s increasing utilization of soft power, Xinhua TV services were to be branded to target
Chinese and overseas audiences globally. In early 2009, a new Xinhua news channel was
launched worldwide, modelled on CNN International or Al-Jazeera English (Oriental Morning
Post, 2009). In fact, by 2009 Xinhua launched several Chinese and English-language news and
current affairs programs, broadcasting via satellite, cable, and Internet worldwide (Wu, 2009).
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The People’s Daily newspaper began its operation in 1948, with involvement by a
number of former Xinhua journalists (People’s Daily Online, 2018). It had a unique relationship
with Xinhua, as it was also a central newspaper and official organ of the Central Committee of
the CCP. The People’s Daily played a role in the CCP’s “thought-works”: “acted as the chief
conduit of ofﬁcial interpretations of all political, economic, social, and cultural events – domestic
and international – to party members and society at large throughout the country” (Lynch, 1999,
p. 160). In fact, for local newspapers, acceptance by the People’s Daily was considered “a
significant criterion by which to judge the quality of a news item” (Guo, 1997, pp. 51-60).
The People’s Daily enjoys the highest editorial priority and privileges, and government
documents and important editorials in the newspaper are aired on the national radio and
television, and reprinted by local news media (Zhao, 1998). The central concept behind the
People’s Daily is the “Party principle” (党性原则); “the news media must accept the Party’s
guiding ideology as its own; that they must propagate the Party’s programs, policies, and
directives; and that they must accept the Party’s leadership and stick to the Party’s organizational
principles and press policies” (Tong and Cheng, 1993). Rosen (2000) identifies the paper’s
fundamental role is to “to inform the public after an authoritative decision has been reached” (p.
155).
The People’s Daily, under the authority of the CPD, is one of the primary elements of the
CCP propaganda system (宣传). The news agency is the chief conduit of official interpretations
of important political, economic, social, and cultural events to Party members and ordinary
people across China (Lynch, 1999). In fact, China regularly asserts its claims in the SCS by
foreign ministry statements and/or through articles in People’s Daily. Turcsanyi (2018) found
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that China started to be more active in its diplomatic push since 2007 as a response to Vietnam’s
increasing effort to individually develop its offshore oil fields (p. 2).
As of 2013, China had the largest newspaper market in the world, its largest daily paper
with a circulation of about three million (BBC, 2013). Even though journalism is increasingly
commercialized, the CCP retains the ideological control of the newspapers (Zhang, 2014, p. 1).
Newspapers and journalists alike enjoy autonomy, but all changes are engineered, approved, or
supported by the CCP (Zhang, 2014, p. 1). There is a total of 18 national newspapers in China,
over 150 regional newspapers, 11 business newspapers, seven technology newspapers, and four
sports newspapers. However, the People’s Daily is the official newspaper of the CCP Central
Committee and the Central Government (Xiong, Wei, and Zhang, 2016). More importantly, it is
considered the most influential and authoritative paper in China, and has the largest circulation
of any newspaper in the country. For major events and issues, the People’s Daily also sets the
tone of coverage that other Chinese newspapers (national and local) have to follow (Song and
Chang, 2012).
The Global Times, a daily newspaper under the auspices of the People’s Daily, focuses
on international issues. Both newspapers have a daily circulation of over 2.4 million, but the
Global Times is deemed the “link between China and the world (Global Times, 2013). The
Global Times, under the auspices of the People’s Daily, is known for its nationalistic and
conservative voices, which may represent an official embrace of nationalism (Zhao, 2013, p.
550; Duan, 2017, p. 891).
The newspaper and magazine market in China are opening up in three stages. Zhang
(2014) describes the three stages as advertising and distribution, non-news, and non-political.
The first phase allows agencies to spin off their commercial operations and float on the stock
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market while editorial operations remain unlisted. Examples include the Beijing Media
Corporation, advertised by the Beijing Youth Daily on the Hong Kong stock exchange (p. 3).
The second stage allows for foreign capital returns on fashion, entertainment, sport, and finance.
The consolidation of Chinese media with reduced funding from the CCP creates an opportunity
for foreign investors. Foreign publishers form partnerships with Chinese media corporations;
publishers gain access to local knowledge and license to print, while Chinese publishers gain
marketing and management expertise (Zhang, 2013, p. 4). The third stage allows non-political
newspapers (evening and city papers run by the CCP, papers run by newspaper groups, and trade
publications run by state-owned enterprises) to float on the stock market. By 2010, 147 state-run
publishing houses transformed into self-financing corporations (Zhang, 2013, p. 4).
Chinese Nationalism
Chinese politics often follows that “surface and reality differ” (表里不一), which makes
the study of Chinese nationalism as it relates to historical context that much more important.
Gries (2004) asserts that the reader of Chinese political materials should listen to “the sound
outside the strings” (弦外之音) (9). In other words, readers must have a deep understanding of
historical and cultural context in order to fully comprehend the proper diplomatic sentiment that
CCP leaders intend. Chinese governments have traditionally sought to derive their power,
through traditional texts, as righteous and benefiting of the people. Chinese governments have
attempted to enforce nationalistic norms in all aspects of life: social, educational, and political.
Multiple scholars have highlighted the concept of soft power as it relates to Confucian thinking,
which emphasizes the power of the leader as a moral exemplar for others to follow (Ding, 2008;
Wang and Lu, 2008).

30

Stratfor (2012) defines Chinese nationalism as an uneasy relationship between the
population’s feelings of pride, disappointment, and hope for China’s future and the CCP’s efforts
to use these feelings as a tool for social management and securing Party control. What is
particularly interesting about Chinese nationalism is how it has been altered in blatantly
contradictory ways. For example, the view of Communist revolutionaries for the goal of nationbuilding relied glorifying liberators during the Opium War at the heroism level. However, during
the 1990s, this Century of Humiliation narrative gained traction, as the CCP wanted to highlight
China as a victim. This victimization narrative highlighted The Rape of Nanking (1937-8), which
marked the “Return to the Motherland” narrative that was meant to “wipe away” the above
mentioned “national humiliation” (Gries, 2004, 47-9). The two narratives now coexist with each
other, as young Chinese nationalists have returned to this idea of victimization. Gries (2004)
mentions that many Chinese nationalists are now primed “to view American or Japanese actions
as aggressive”, spreading anger and “desires for vengeance” (52-3).
This contradictory presentation of Chinese nationalism by the CCP can be attributed to
responsive authoritarianism. Przeworski (1999) defines a responsive government as one that
“adopts policies signaled as preferred by citizens” (9). Multiple scholars assert that the Chinese
party-state model has been durable longer than any other communist regime due to its
“responsiveness” (Nathan, 2003; Reilly, 2011; Weller, 2011). In either case, the CCP faces a
dilemma as to how it will continue to draw attention away from domestic problems. As the party
was founded in popular nationalism (i.e. what is good for the Party is good for the country),
continued rhetoric regarding the integration between the Party and the state is that much more
important. Stratfor (2012) points out that this type of nationalist sentiment poses greater
challenges to Beijing, especially as the Party has positioned itself as a vehicle for economic
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reform and prosperity. More recent demonstrators calling for Western-style reforms may soon
call for alternative visions of China separate from the Party.
The concept of modern nationalism was first observed in China at the turn of the 20th
century. This modern Chinese nationalism displayed a strong ethnic, arguably xenophobic, strain
in opposing imperialism and Manchu rule (Townsend, 1992, p. 114). First interpretations of this
shift cite culturalism, a common historical heritage and acceptance of shared beliefs. Harrison
(1969) identifies two elements of early Chinese culturalism in understanding its origins. First, the
notion that China was the only true civilization; non-Chinese peoples may be military threats, but
they could never be true rivals because of their cultural backwardness. Second, that Chinese
rulers must be educated in Confucian principles. The rulers’ loyalty lied in principles, not a
particular nation. Therefore, Chinese culturalism explains not just the empire’s capacity to
survive, but also why it fell when an external culture penetrated China (Harrison, 1969; Wang,
2003).
The arrival of Marxism in the 20th century brought the popular nationalism argument to
China. The working and peasant “masses”, an anti-imperialist force by definition, became agents
of Chinese history (Cohen, 1997, pp. 227-45). When the Communists claimed victory in the
revolution in 1949, mass nationalism became even more predominant. While Communist
ideology follows that the masses “be given agency in leading the revolution”, dictates of
nationalist politics demanded that such assertions be qualified by the ubiquitous “under the
leadership of the Party” (Gries, 2004, p. 117). Therefore, if the CCP was a “party of the people”,
they played a lead role in the nationalist revolution, with a Marxist view of mass nationalism
(Gries, 2004, p. 117).
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The early 1990s brought a resurgence of nationalist and patriotic rhetoric among Chinese
intellectuals and subsequently the Chinese public. Eager for a “win” for China, the Tiananmen
Square incident and the fall of the Soviet Union translated into a public sense of China’s return
to global prominence (Stratfor, 2012). China experienced a wave of economic growth after 1992,
which was exemplified by the 1996 bestseller China Can Say No, a book written as a critique to
China embracing Western values (Gries, 2004, p. 120). This eruption of national pride gained
momentum with incidents like the 1999 Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade, Yugoslavia
(Serbia) (caused by erroneous targeting data), and the EP-3 spy plane collision (resulting in the
death of a Chinese pilot) (Rosenthal and Sanger, 2001). These events allowed for the perfect
storm for Chinese academics and media personalities to fuel popular anger by attributing China’s
history of suffering to Western imperialism (Stratfor, 2012).
Chinese nationalism, beginning at the turn of the 20th century, configured itself largely in
two forms: that of the national, and that of a member of the international community (Chen,
2004, p. 4). Wei and Liu (2002) go on to explain the key characteristics of the Chinese national (
国民), which differs from the standard understanding of citizen in its focus on membership,
belonging, and identity; not necessarily rights and civic duties (p. 6). In this sense, a Chinese
national is one that can lay claim to this special relationship with the state, regardless of
geographic realities. Chinese nationalism began with a sense of hope for a strong and healthy
nation, specifically ideas of national reconstruction (rejuvenation), state-building, antiforeignism,
and Marxism (9).
One interpretation of Chinese nationalism is an aggressive, chauvinistic ideology
promoted by the CCP to provide political legitimacy (Friedman, 1997, p. 5-33). Chinese
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nationalism is very unique and isolated from other forms of nationalism. Chinese nationalism is
closely related to the “interest of the state” and a unique loyalty to the national government. Wei
and Liu (2002) argue that as European nationalism is generally associated with a strong pride
and even racism against the “other” (foreigners), and Chinese nationalism similarly surfaced as a
Han-oriented chauvinism (9). Chinese nationalism began with a sense of hope for a strong and
healthy nation, specifically ideas of national reconstruction (rejuvenation), state-building,
antiforeignism, and Marxism (Chen, 2004, p. 31).
Townsend (1992) asserts that there are four different Chinese nations that continue to
exist (128). This fact alone highlights the struggle that the CCP faces in unifying nationalist
rhetoric across China. The first form of nationalist rhetoric is that which is used all across China,
Han and non-Han alike. Second is the ethnic nationalism, composed largely of Han-ethnic
groups. Third are the “compatriots”, a product of ethnic nationalism, that is currently under a
political authority other than China (i.e. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao). Finally, the last form
consists of geographically separated Chinese. This group includes those that retain some idea of
dual nationality, with a continuing sense of cultural attachment to China (Townsend, 1992, p.
128). Each of these terms of alignment are inherently nationalist, but the logic behind them
differentiate the degree to which the person is aligned with the goals of the CCP.
Though nationalism has been observed in democratic systems, nationalism generally
implies exclusiveness while democracy is based on [some level] of inclusivity (Beethan and
Boyle 1995). Zhong (2018) found that aggressive nationalism plays a strong role in Chinese
urban residents’ political trust in the central government (75). Chinese nationalism is not about
national identity, rather about feelings toward the outside world; describing role should China
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play in international issues. This link between less-informed citizenry and nationalistic trends is
central to understanding how China utilizes information control in achieving its strategic goals:
Chinese urban residents were not around national identity, but rather about feelings
toward the outside world or outward nationalism: the role that China should play in Asia
and the world and whether China should use force to take the Diaoyu Islands back from
Japan, even though such an action could trigger a war with Japan. As mentioned before,
Chinese nationalism is on the rise with rapid economic growth and increasing Chinese
assertiveness in international affairs. In China as in other countries, foreign policy is still
the dominant responsibility of the central government. People who have strong outward
nationalist feelings have to place higher levels of political trust in the central government
to implement more effective and aggressive foreign policy (Zhong, 2018, p. 79).
There is debate over whether Confucianism and nationalism are compatible. One group
offers that because Confucian universalism allows for anyone to become Chinese, so long as
they accept the Sinocentric civilization. Others argue that Confucianism refers to only “all under
heaven” (天下) (Gries, 2004, p. 8), which could be referred to as only China (assuming that
China is the center of the universe). Both arguments warrant merit, but it seems that regardless,
Confucianism has become the basis for this new Chinese nationalism.
China, particularly the CCP, has been struggling to create a unique identity for its citizens
that will enhance legitimization, trust, and normalization of its authoritarian communism.
Traditionally, China has attempted to root this identity in well-known philosophical traditions,
religions, and grandeur ideas of historical Chinese greatness. The CCP has placed a high priority
on this idea of national identity as a means of legitimization, and has invested heavily into this
through a slanted re-writing of history, biased interpretation of current events, and an overarching “China as the global victim” branding of its people. It is important to consider the CCP’s
national identity, how it is rooted in philosophic traditions, and contradictions the party makes in
this attempt. More recently, the CCP has become less ideologically based. Since the 1980s, it has
emerged as less of a revolutionary party of worker-peasants, and morphed into a nationalist party
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of elites (Wang and Tadd, 2016, p. 237). Gewirtz offers concern for future sources of values in
China: “The announced ideology of China’s Communist Party no longer seems to be a source of
moral values for Chinese society. Indeed, it is no longer clear what that ideology really is”
(Ivanhoe and Van Norden, 2016, p. 2).
The method by which the CCP reinforces nationalism to the public is particularly
intriguing. The antagonistic thrust of official nationalism in China was crystalized in the CCP’s
rhetoric of “patriotism” (爱国主义). The ideology of patriotism, a corollary to national pride and
sovereignty, centers around a history of Western antagonism and present hostility (Xu, 2000, p.
121). Stratfor (2012) argues that Chinese nationalism is a “power instrument that temporarily
shifts the public’s focus away from domestic and internal Party problems” by reinforcing the
Party’s role as the guardian of China’s national sovereignty and honor. However, it has been
demonstrated that the use of nationalism in China has expanded to shift focus away from foreign
policy issues as well.
China has run into a foundational conundrum in offering contradictory explanations or
sentiments in order to convey its policies. Rorty (1989) refers to this as a problem of “final
vocabulary” (73). He states that all human beings carry about a set of words which they employ
to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives… if doubt is cast upon the worth of these
words, their user has no noncircular argumentative recourse (Rorty, 1989, p. 73). No person or
organization is forced to speak any sentiment; the words that we choose are nothing but our own.
Therefore, any contradictions are inherently a fault of logic, and could not reasonably be
acceptable from a deliberate, worthy, moral government.
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Authoritarian regimes in Asia have recently experimented with varying forms of political
participation and deliberation. Beginning in the 1990s, the CCP introduced village-level
elections, approval and recall at the local level, public hearings, deliberative polls, citizen rights
to sue the state, moves to make government information public, and other political participatory
innovations (He and Warren, 2011, p. 269). However, these practices are uneven in scope and
effectiveness, and deliberations only focused on particular problems of governance (269). He and
Warren (2011) point out that these practices are unique in an authoritarian government, and refer
to these practices by an authoritarian regime with no apparent interest in regime-level
democratization as “authoritarian deliberation” (269). Scholars agree that this style of
governance prioritizes the “top-level design” and discourages local responsiveness (Shambaugh,
2015; Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019; Yang and Yan, 2019).
He and Warren (2011) point out a key difference between democracies and regimes;
democracy refers not to communication, but a distribution of powers of decision to those
affected (272). Democracy allows empowerment through opportunities to vote for political
representatives, to vote directly on policies, representative oversight and accountability, due
process, etc. Deliberative authoritarianism is an ideal type of regime that combines concentrated
power (power not distributed to the people) with deliberative communication.
Chen (2004) asserts that the Chinese people have been bombarded with messages that
“being patriotic and nationalistic” is to support the national government, along with Chinese
norms and values (107). “Without the emphasis on historical memories, the Chinese people
would not have been so easily spurred into taking action” (Wang, 2012, p. 199). Wang discusses
the deep sense of historical victimization that the CCP has created within the Chinese people
(200). This vantage point affects the Chinese peoples’ attitudes, interpretations, and judgement
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of current events from outside powers. In turn, these perceptions and sensitivities in times of
crisis allow support for the CCP to act in an aggressive manner. Historical memory, in this sense,
is the recurring factor that explains continued Chinese aggression.
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Chapter 3: South China Sea and Strategic
Prioritization
Historical Background
One of the most famous legal cases regarding the right to claim ownership of a territory
took place in 1925 between the U.S. and the Netherlands, over the ownership of Palmas in the
Indian Ocean. The U.S. assumed ownership of the island because Spain had succeeded the
Philippines, and Palmas was assumed to be part of the island chain. However, an international
arbitration panel ruled in favor of the Netherlands, based on effective occupation. The ruling set
a precedent for necessity of occupancy and control over an area to establish sovereignty,
regardless of first discovery or assumed ownership (Nielsen, 1928). The UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the second legal framework that shaped the SCS dispute, and is the
result of multiple conferences that took place between 1973-1982. This international law
provided updates to arbitration and definitions regarding maritime sovereignty. Morton &
Blackmore (2001) note that as technologies advanced during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, states required a much larger buffer zone to protect their national interests (1236).
Taiping Island (Itu Aba) in the SCS was first used by Chinese fishermen in the 1870s. In
1932, France formally claimed the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and in 1933 seized and annexed
them as a part of French Indochina. Japan rejected the claim, and annexed the island in 1938,
making it a part of Taiwan (then also under Japanese rule). Because of that administrative
placement, Taiwan has occupied Taiping Island and the adjacent Zhongzhou Reef since 1956
(Myers, 2018). Taiping Island is the only source of fresh water in the Spratly Island chain, which
is a key point of contention for Taiwan. Taiwanese leaders insist that because the island can
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sustain habitation of its own, it should, by definition, be considered an island. (Focus Taiwan,
2019). However, A PCA tribunal in 2016 ruled that the island was classified as a rock, rather
than an island, and therefore not entitled to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Both Taiwan
and China rejected that ruling (PCA, 2016).
Taiwan is in a particularly challenging position because of its unique relationship with
China. Immediately following World War II (WWII), conflict between the nationalist
Government of the Republic of China (ROC) and CCP erupted. The political unrest, began with
the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Popular frustration mounted after the Japanese invasion of
Manchuria, warlord insurrections, and undemocratic policies during WWII set the stage for
resurgence of communist forces. After the Japanese surrender and failed talks between the two
parties in 1945, China was in an all-out civil war by 1946. As the CCP had strong grassroots
support and superior military organization and supplies (seized from the Japanese), the they
ultimately declared victory in 1949. Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the PRC in
1949. However, early in 1947, the ROC Government had fled to Taiwan to regroup and plan to
retake the mainland (U.S. State Department, 2016). To this day, Taiwan’s sovereignty is debated,
whether it should be considered part of China or its own independent ROC.
One of the earliest large-scale naval conflicts between China and Vietnam took place in
1974 over the Paracel Islands (Xisha in Chinese, Hoang Sa in Vietnamese). In fact, the majority
of conflicts in the SCS have occurred between China and Vietnam. Vietnamese and U.S. naval
forces were observing two Chinese armored fishing trawlers near Drummond Island in January
1974. The naval forces were supporting troops occupying the area. The Chinese vessels declined
to leave after Saigon sent naval vessels to order the Chinese withdraw. Both sides refused to
leave, making a showdown unavoidable. On January 19, 1974, Vietnamese troops opened fire on
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Chinese troops on Duncan Island. Chinese forces responded, and it ultimately ended with
Vietnam’s defeat and China gained control over all of the Paracel Islands. Battles between China
and Vietnam have continued, and as recently as 2012, Chinese vessels cut the cables to a
commercial Vietnamese ship conducting tests forty-three miles southeast of Vietnam’s Quang
Tri Province (Daniels, 2013).
Relations between China and the Philippines were strained in 1994, after the Philippine
government approved an oil exploration mission. The joint venture between U.S. and Philippine
companies, were set to conduct oil exploration near the Reed Bank, northeast of the Spratly
Islands. The Chinese saw this as a blatant infringement on their sovereignty. Chinese-built
structures were discovered on Mischief Reef in 1995, further straining the China-Philippine
relationship. Mischief Reef falls well within the Philippines-claimed EEZ. In response, the
Filipino government used aerial surveillance to gain a better understanding of Chinese
development on the island. They discovered war journalism platforms on stilts, each with three
to four bunkers equipped with satellite communication equipment. The Philippines learned of
further developments of Mischief Island in 1996, and even more structures appeared in Kota
Islands, all of which fell within Philippine EEZ (Daniels, 2013, p. 10).
In 1995, Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui made an attempt at peaceful resolution to the
SCS. He urged all claimants to the SCS should cancel individual claims, and invest in the SCS
Development Company. This company would then develop projects within each of the
respective countries, and avoid interstate conflict. The dispute continues because the states
involved could not reach an agreement (Watts, 2011).
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International Law and Maritime Disputes
Traditionally, oceans have long been subject to the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine. This
17th century principle limited national rights and jurisdiction over oceans to a narrow belt of sea
surrounding a nation’s coastline (now known as EEZ). The remainder of the oceans were “free to
all and belonging to none”. Growing concerns about coastal fish stocks rose in the twentieth
century, as the secondary affects from fish populations and ship waste were realized. States’
rights to resources also came into question; whether a state owns the fish stocks, oil, minerals, or
other natural resources in their respective EEZs. Growing demands for all of these resources
heightened the tension between states and those who sought to gain from them. The U.S. set the
precedent in 1945, unilaterally claiming all national resources in its EEZ. In the following years,
several other states followed suit, laying claim to a 200-mile zone from their borders (UN, 1998).
The UNCLOS establishes a 12-mile territorial limit for coastal states. Within this limit, a
state could theoretically impose any law, and exploit and regulate any resource. During the
creation stages of this measure of the UNCLOS, large debate existed between coastal states and
states with major naval powers. Historically, coastal states followed the “cannon-shot” rule,
meaning they could exercise sovereignty over roughly 3 nautical miles (NM). UNCLOS landed
on the 12 NM limit, which effectively closed off over 100 straits traditionally used for
international navigation. However, foreign warships were granted “innocent passage” through
the waters, and “transient passage” to all other ships and vessels. Both of which simultaneously
allowed states to retain sovereignty over the waters, while guaranteeing peaceful, unimpeded
voyages (UN, 1998).
The UNCLOS also created the EEZ to in response to the management and conservation
of resources. The desire of coastal states to control fish harvest was the driving factor behind
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EEZs. However, the EEZ also covers the right to exploit, develop, manage, and conserve all
resources found in the waters, ocean floor, and subsoil of an area extending 200 NM form a
coastal state’s shore. Since the creation of the EEZ, 86 coastal states have economic jurisdiction
up to the 200 NM limit, and ninety-nine percent of the world’s fisheries fall under some nation’s
jurisdiction (as opposed to international waters).
The UNCLOS also addresses the extent of control states have over resources on their
continental shelf. During the creation phase of this term, debate centered around whether to
extend state control of resources to coincide with its EEZ. Articles 55-75 of UNCLOS state that
the sovereign rights of a coastal State’s EEZ extends 200 NM from their baseline. However, it
also states that the absolute limit, if including maritime areas where sovereignty is exercised, if
350 NM from the state’s coast, dependent on the thickness of sedimentary deposits. Additionally,
if a state extends its continental shelf, it must “contribute to a system of sharing revenue derived
from the exploitation of resources beyond 200 NM” (UN, 1998).
Finally, UNCLOS addresses the powers to govern, the settlement of cases, and member
participation. In short, there is no universal participation, rather, rights are granted only to
participating states. That said, states must “join the club” in order to enjoy its benefits. Only
member states are granted the rights under UNCLOS, while all states still confirm existing
customary law. Regarding the settlement of disputes, UNCLOS incorporated a mechanism to do
so. Four options exist when direct talks between states fail: International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, adjudication by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), submission to binding
international arbitration procedures, or submission to special arbitration tribunals. The parties
involved in the dispute are committed to the decision of any these four third-party settlements in
advance (UN, 1998).
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We can expect that states will choose arbitration type based on the likelihood of
achieving their desired result. The UNCLOS dispute resolution system offers arbitration for
states that may encounter violations regarding the convention. Since 1994, states have made little
use of the arbitration system: less than 25% to be exact (UN, 2017). UNCLOS offers 4 separate
options that states must choose from in settling these types of disputes: The ICJ, the International
Tribunal on the Law of Sea, private arbitration, or special tribunals convened to resolve unique
scientific and environmental matters (Gates, 2017, p. 287). Powell and Wiegand (2014) maintain
that “states are heavily influenced in their decision calculus by a political mechanism of their
past experience with binding methods in resolving territorial disputes (363).
Bateman (2011) labels the SCS a “wicked problem” for maritime security. Specifically,
that states each hold differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea (p. 2). Conflicting
sovereignty claims and management of the risk of greater regional naval activity is especially
dangerous. There are essentially two ways for claimant states to manage these risks: building
their own naval and air capabilities to protect their interests, and/or negotiating with their rivals
(either bilaterally or through regional arrangements). (Bateman, 2011, p. 2). The following
increase in military capabilities may give insight into which countries chose to take security into
their own hands:
Southeast Asian armed forces over the past decade have acquired “fourth generation”
fighter aircraft, submarines, air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, frigates, amphibious
assault ships, anti-ship cruise missiles, and new command-control-communicationscomputing-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. Arms imports
to Indonesia and Malaysia have gone up 84% and 722%, respectively, between 2000 and
2010. Vietnam has spent $2 billion on six state-of-the art Kilo-class Russian submarines
and $1 billion on Russian jet fighters. Malaysia just opened a submarine base in Borneo.
The Philippines committed $118 million in 2011 to purchase a naval patrol vessel and six
helicopters to provide a security perimeter for a joint natural gas venture with Shell
Philippines. Though primarily a land power, Thailand has considerable maritime
interests, including the protection of offshore oil and gas resources. Bangkok has
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acquired frigates from the U.S. and Britain, off shore patrol vessels (OPV) from China,
and is negotiating with Germany for the purchase of refurbished submarines. Thailand
participates in the Malaysia-Indonesia-Singapore “Eye in the Sky” component of the antipiracy Malacca Straits Patrols. That is, Thailand is now part of the littoral countries’
airborne anti-piracy surveillance of the Malacca Straits. Additionally, in September 2011
Indonesia and Vietnam agreed to establish joint patrols on their maritime borders to
improve their SCS monitoring capabilities. Indonesia’s EEZ overlaps China’s claim
within the nine-dash line. (Simon, 2012, p. 998)
ASEAN
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a multilateral organization with
the goal of promoting economic growth, regional peace, and active collaboration among
southeast Asian nations (ASEAN, 2020). As it relates to the SCS, ASEAN has become involved
in promoting the peaceful development of SCS resources. The organization was established in
1967, and has played an active role in maintaining peace in southeast Asia. Notably, it negotiated
the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the SCS among the claimants. At the time, ASEAN sought to
form a code of conduct (COC) for its member states. Though it was not able to do so, the
declaration was symptomatic of a trend towards adoption of norms in the regulation of SCS
disputes (Buszynski, 2003).
In fact, ASEAN member states have been engaged in discussions on a potential COC for
over two decades. The organization first endorsed the idea of a COC in 1996, but China and
ASEAN settled for a nonbinding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS in 2002
(guidelines for which were not adopted until 2011). The declaration serves to reaffirm respect for
freedom of navigation in and overflight above the SCS, undertake peaceful dispute resolution,
undertake self-restraint in dispute conflict, and reaffirm adoption of a code of conduct in SCS to
further promote peace (Nguyen, 2002). Some observers believe that China has been dragging out
the COC negotiations, as part of a “talk and take” strategy (i.e. Beijing engages or prolongs
negotiations while simultaneously taking action to control contested areas (Economist, 2017,
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YingHui, 2017, Thu, 2018). ASEAN states take varying positions on the SCS dispute:
historically, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar (Burma) lean toward China; Malaysia and Indonesia
are cautious about U.S. involvement; Thailand and Singapore are neutral; and Vietnam and the
Philippines welcome an increased American role (Bateman, 2011; Peiyaswamy, 2011).

Figure 3.1: Overlapping Claims to the South China Sea
Paracel Islands
• Claimed by: China and Vietnam
• Occupied by China
Spratly Islands
• Claimed by: China, Taiwan, Vietnam
•Partially claimed by: Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei
• Occupied by: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia
Scarborough Shoal
• Claimed by: China, Taiwan, and the Philippines
• Occupied by: China
Senkaku Islands (ECS)
• Claimed by: China, Taiwan, and Japan
• Occupied by: Japan

Source: Author generated
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China, Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim the SCS in its entirety. Malaysia, Philippines,
Indonesia, and Brunei, have asserted sovereignty only over islands that are near or fall within
their boundaries, as recognized by international law. In the late 1940s, Chinese geographers
produced a map that detailed its claims to the SCS. The map, known as the nine-dash line,
includes all of the islands of the SCS and the island of Taiwan. New interpretations of
international law have arguably affected China the most. Chinese claims are based solely on
historical claims, which hold very little weight in international law. Chinese officials argue that
their claim predates UNCLOS, and should be accommodated accordingly (Daniels, 2012, p. 8).
Within ASEAN, the features claimed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei are also claimed
by Vietnam. So, not only are these claimants arrayed against China, they are also arrayed against
each other (Simon, 2012, p. 997).
Taiwan’s claims to the SCS mirror those of China, and are based on historical claims.
Taiwan has remained a marginal player in the dispute, but has been unsuccessful in its attempts
to be included in multilateral mechanisms aimed at managing or resolving disputes, namely a
code of conduct in the SCS. Because both China and Taiwan’s claims to the Spratly Islands and
other parts of the SCS predate the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan’s claim to any part of the SCS is
counterintuitive (Myers, 2018). Daniels (2012) asserts that Taiwan would be best served to,
instead, bolster ties with regional powers. As Taiwan lacks the military resources to enforce SCS
claims, it will remain a minor actor in the overall dispute (4-5).
Vietnam claims the SCS in its entirety as well. Their historical claim is largely based on
the Khanh Hoa Province. Hanoi considers the Spratly Islands to be a component of this
Vietnamese province, and has established a government there. This tie was damaged after the
reunification of Vietnam and implementation of communist policies. The Hoa people had their
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wealth confiscated and redistributed, and some were required to move from cities to rural areas
to support farming (Daniels, 2012, p. 4). This weakened Vietnam’s claim from the “effective
occupation” precedent.
The Philippines claim about fifty small islands in the SCS. Similar to the Japanese
inheritance of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS), the Philippine government was
transferred the rights of the Kalayaan Island chain in 1974 from a private citizen. Thomas
Cloma, a Filipino lawyer and businessman took ownership of the rocks after Japan renounced its
ownership at the 1951 San Francisco peace Conference. Shortly after, in 1978, the Philippine
government declared the islands a part of the Philippines (Storey, 1999, p. 96). However, the
Tribunal found that all fixtures in the SCS were rocks, which directly challenges the rights of the
Kalayaans. Similarly, Indonesia and Brunei are not looking to claim sovereignty over large
swaths of land. Specifically, Indonesia claims only its already-established boundaries, including
the Natuna Islands (Rosenburg, 2010). Indonesia’s submission is designed to foreclose any
Chinese argument that China’s territorial waters include the rich fishery and seabed natural gas
area north of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands (Simon, 2012, p. 998). Brunei is interested only in
protecting its EEZ as afforded by UNCLOS (Ring, 2012).
Malaysia claims only a small segment of the Spratly Islands, and maintains a small
military presence there to enforce its claim. However, Malaysia has sought peaceful resolution
through joint economic development plans for the SCS region (Rosenburg, 2010). Curiously,
China is Malaysia’s biggest trading partner. Devadason (2009) points out that Malaysia is
China’s third-biggest trading partner, trading more than any other ASEAN country (36-49).
China and Malaysia’s trade ties have grown faster than any in the world, reaching a bilateral
trade volume of $100 billion USD by 2019 (The Star, 2019). In fact, President Xi Jinping
48

elevated their ties to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” (Fong, Ponnan, and De Rycker,
2020, p. 41).
Figure 3.2: Visualization of Claims and EEZs in South China Sea

Source: Illustration from Guoxing, August 2001.
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The International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) defines the SCS as “south of China,
east of Vietnam, west of the Philippines, east of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, and north of
Bangka Belitung Islands and Borneo (IHO, 1953). The waters include an archipelago of islands
in the hundreds. The sovereignty of the waters is disputed by virtually all of its inhabitants,
China referring to it as the SCS, Vietnam the East Sea, Philippines the West Philippine Sea
(Official Gazette, 2012), and Indonesia the North Natuna Sea (Parameswaran, 2017). The
majority of the ECS and SCS lies outside of the exclusive economic zone of mainland China.
According to UN rules regarding EEZs, only parts of the Paracel Islands lie within the Chinese
zone, leaving the rest of the SCS and ECS either within another country’s EEZ or international
waters.
Outside of economic opportunity, physical control the SCS offers the potential for
regional dominance. Physical control of the waters equates to the control of every other aspect
(political, economic, etc.). Key basing locations, along with naval and air operations would
solidify control of key shipping lanes for nearly a dozen states. Theoretically, physical control
could also allow for revenue streams from taxing any waterway movement.
Beijing’s Key Activities in South China Sea
Land Reclamation
In late 2013, China doubled-down on its claims to the SCS by physically creating islands
out of reefs. In short, these artificial islands were created by dredging millions of tons of rock
and sand onto pre-existing reefs (Wingfield-Hayes, 2014). The new land is accompanied by a sea
wall, and paved over with concrete. Referred to as the “great wall of sand” by Admiral Harris,
U.S. Navy, the initial construction between 2012 and 2015 created over 4 square kilometers of
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artificial landmass in the SCS (Guardian, 2015). From 2013 to 2020, China created a total of 5
square miles of new land mass (AMTI, 2020). Though construction of these artificial islands in
the SCS began in late 2013, news of the construction did not break until 2015. This is largely due
to the availability of information, as the only evidence is satellite imagery. There was likely
military reporting on the topic immediately, but it wasn’t made publicly available until April
2015 (BBC, 2015).
According to satellite imagery from early 2016, China possibly started the construction of
the second airstrip in the Paracel Islands at the North and Middle Islands (Lee, 2016a). This
brings China’s combined total of known airstrips to five, in the disputed areas of the SCS at its
disposal. Two airstrips were observed in the Paracel Islands (one at Woody Island and the new
one at the North and Middle Islands) and two in the Spratly Islands (one at Fiery Cross Reef and
another unfinished one at Subi Reef) (Lee, 2015d; Lee, 2016; AMTI, 2016). There is also one
more recently confirmed at Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands (Tweed, 2018).
In June 2015 China announced that the land reclamation in the SCS would end soon
(MFA China 2015; BBC 2015). According to satellite imagery, the reclamation indeed finished
in many of the posts in the Spratly Islands, but the construction work was actively continuing
Lee, 2015d). Besides this, the reclamation works in the Paracel Islands also went on after this
date (Lee 2015c). There were also signs that possible reclamation works began at Scarborough
Shoal as well (Panda, 2016), but eventually, China withdrew from controlling the area and
allowed the Filipino fishermen to enter. However, Chinese patrol vessels remained present in the
vicinity (Mogato 2016; AP, 2016).
Outside of the impact this has had on the territorial dispute, this has key impact on
regional stability. Island building received large amounts of global coverage, but little is written
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on the military upgrades documented on the islands. In a speech at the White House in
September 2015, President Xi Jinping stated that he “did not intend to pursue militarization” of
the SCS (White House, 2015). Fifteen months later, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative
(AMTI) released satellite imagery showing just that (Phillips, 2016). China occupies 20 outposts
in the Paracel Islands, multiple naval harbors, helipads, airfields, and surface-to-air missiles
(SAM). Specifically, China occupies seven sites in the Spratly Islands. It has engaged in islandbuilding and facility construction at almost all of these seven sites, particularly at Fiery Cross
Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. A 2018 overflight revealed that Subi Reef and Fiery Cross
Reef were fortified with barracks, bunkers, radars, military runways, and army vehicles. There
have been multiple reports of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles on these islands, as well as longrange bomber refueling (Beech, 2018).
Harassment/Violence
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2017) analyzed data from a list of
all incidents that occurred in the SCS. Their data includes 70 incidents that occurred in the SCS
between 2010 and 2017, and are coded for the type of incident, which states were involved, and
the outcome of the event. The purpose of their analysis is to consider whether maritime law
enforcement forces in the region are destabilizing. “In recent years, many of these countries have
mobilized government vessels traditionally used for maritime law enforcement to reinforce their
territorial claims. Key among these states is China, which has actively employed its coast guard
and other maritime law enforcement agencies to project power and assert sovereignty throughout
the SCS” (China Power Project, 2016).
Beginning in early 2012, Chinese ships have expelled, detained, and detained, and
harassed multiple Vietnamese ships near the Paracel Islands. On March 3, 2012, Chinese
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officials arrested 21 Vietnamese fishermen for illegal fishing. They asked for CNY 70,000 (USD
$11,199) each for the release of the crewmen. The detention sparked strong protest from
Vietnam, which asserts this action as a violation of their sovereignty. Vietnam also argues that
according to UNCLOS Article 73, “coastal state penalties for violations of fisheries laws and
regulations in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of
agreements to the contrary by the states concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment”
(Vietnam News, 2012) China continues to assert its sovereignty in the ECS, claiming that nearly
80% of Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) falls within its territory. Chinese sources reported the
incident as illegal because the fishermen were “bomb fishing”. The ransom was reported as a
fine for illegal fishing according to Chinese laws (Xinhua, 2012).
In April 2012, Chinese fishing vessels were spotted in a lagoon near Scarborough Shoal.
The news of the Shoal dispute was the first of many that brought global attention to the overall
SCS disputes. In short, the Philippine Navy accused China of illegal fishing within Bajo de
Masinloc’s (Scarborough) EEZ. As a result, the Philippines elected to bring the dispute to the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Chinese officials rejected the claim,
affirming that the Shoal as “inherent territory on which we have sufficient legal basis”
(Philippine Daily, 2012). Aside from the debate over the territory itself, China chose to use this
incident shines a light on whether the UN is the appropriate arbitrator in these maritime disputes.
In June 2012, ties between China and Vietnam are again heightened, as Vietnam declares
sovereignty over both the Spratly and Paracel Islands. In response, China raised the
administrative status of islands in the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos to “prefecture” and
announced the city responsible for administering them. China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) later made nine offshore blocks in the SCS, effectively creating zoning areas for oil
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and gas companies to explore. Even though the blocked area lies entirely within Vietnam’s EEZ
according to UNCLOS, the enormous estimations of natural resources in this specific area makes
the dispute more valuable. This value is exponential, given that China’s oil consumption
increased more than 23% between 2009 and 2012 (CEIC, 2018).
In December 2012, Japan detained a Chinese fishing boat within Japanese waters in the
ECS. China has been increasing its maritime surveillance vessel patrols in the contested water
with Japan, in an effort to prove its freedom of movement. That same month, two naval
destroyers, along with nine other ex-navy vessels were transferred to the Chinese maritime
surveillance fleet (Al Jazeera, 2012). This move underscores China Marine Surveillance’s
commitment to “protecting China's interests and executing law enforcement missions”, and more
importantly, the strategic importance Chinese leadership placed on the ECS dispute with Japan.
There have also been reports of Chinese overflights in the ECS, which have not been observed
since at least 1958 (AFP, 2012).
China’s establishment of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China
Sea may be the most assertive move made throughout the entirety of these regional disputes.
ADIZs are designated air zones that restrict all aircraft movement. These zones, similar to naval
blockades, are meant to establish and maintain air dominance over an area. Though typically
played by governments as a safety restriction, they are often meant to deny an adversary
overflight or strategic advantage from the air (Johnson, 2017). This case is no different; as Japan
and the U.S. have an interest in asserting their freedom of navigation in these regions, this ADIZ
served as a physical dedication to asserting its sovereignty claims to the ECS. The ADIZ covered
much of the SCS, and included Senkaku Islands (Indian Express, 2013). Chinese officials
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announced that any aircraft entering the zone are required to submit flight plans of “face
defensive emergency measures” (New Zealand Herald, 2013).
In May 2014, state-owned China Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOC) moved an oil rig to
the SCS, near the Paracel Islands. This move, known as the Zhongjiannan Project, was prompted
by the potential for oil and gas in the region. The rig’s drilling operation only lasted 2 months, as
a preliminary collection to analyze the natural resources in the area. China Coast Guard, Navy,
and civilian fishing ships accompanied the rig, which were soon met by Vietnamese Coast Guard
and Fisheries Resources Surveillance (VFRS). Chinese ships formed a “protective ring” to head
off the incoming ships, creating a 3 NM perimeter. By mid-May, drilling had begun and the
perimeter expanded to 15 NM (CSIS, 2017). This project sparked violent riots within Vietnam,
prompting the evacuation of thousands of Chinese nationals (Armstrong, 2014). The company
asserted the territorial claims, stating that “a third of China’s oil and gas resources are under the
SCS” (Li, 2014).
The U.S. regularly flies and sails within international waters, including the SCS and ECS,
to exercise freedom of navigation (FON). In 2 separate incidents, in 2014 and 2016, Chinese
fighter jets intercepted U.S. aircraft flying said FON missions. The 2014 incident included
acrobatic maneuvers around the U.S. plane, in order to reveal the weaponry onboard the Chinese
aircraft in a show of force. The 2016 event was characterized as unsafe, as 2 Chinese J-11 fighter
jets flew within 50 feet of the U.S. aircraft several times (Mogato, 2016). The intercept took
place about 135 miles east of Hainan Island, the southernmost province of mainland China (Lyle,
2014).
Numerous headlines have included the SCS since the 1970s, including the Paracel Islands
in 1974, Johnson Reef in 1988, Paracel Island in 1995, and Scarborough Shoal in 2012. In the
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early 2000s, frictions were reduced as China became more open to reassuring ASEAN
counterparts of its peaceful approach to SCS disagreements (Glaser, 2011). In fact, the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003 signaled a significant breakthrough for peace between
China, the Philippines, and Vietnam over the disputes. The follow-on treaty in 2005 created even
more hope as it restrained any provocative moves from regional actors (Glaser, 2011).
External Intervention
The core of the SCS sovereignty dispute lies within defining from where an EEZ can be
derived. Articles 55-75 of UNCLOS state that the sovereign rights of a coastal State’s EEZ
extends 200 NM from their baseline. However, it also states that the absolute limit, if including
maritime areas where sovereignty is exercised, if 350 NM from the state’s coast. All of which
hinges on the assumption that China if defined as a coastal state to the SCS. The fact that
mainland China is 550 NM from the limits of the nine-dash line makes the claim even less
plausible (Zimmerman and Baumler, 2013). Indonesia directly challenged China’s claim in 2009,
stating that all features in the SCS are rocks, not islands, therefore, may not claim a 200 NM
territorial sea claim. UNCLOS states that only islands are entitled to a 200 NM EEZ (as well as a
territorial sea, contiguous zone, and continental shelf (Keating, 2018)). The difference between a
rock and an island is that the latter is “capable of sustaining human habitation or economic
activity” (Simon, 2012).
In 2002, China agreed to take part in a multi-lateral forum with ASEAN. ASEAN is a
multinational organization focused on promoting stability in among its state members. ASEAN
and China issued the “Declaration on the conduct of parties in the SCS”, in a move toward
promoting China’s “peaceful development” approach to dispute resolution. However, in 2005,
the clash between China and Vietnam proved the declaration ineffective. On Jan 8, 2005, the
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Chinese Navy opened fire on a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands, killing 8
fishermen (CSIS, 2017). It is unclear the real effect ASEAN will have in deterring Beijing from
any further aggression.
To help answer these questions of sovereignty, The UN PCA rendered its response on the
SCS Arbitration Tribunal. The tribunal found that China’s claim to historic rights to the SCS
(nine-dash line) were “incompatible with the EEZs provided” (PCA, 2016). In other words, the
claims did not trump the Philippines’ inherent sovereignty. The Tribunal also found that Chinese
actions in the SCS (interfering with Philippine fishing, constructing islands, and allowing
Chinese fishing) violated Philippine sovereignty. It added that Chinese law enforcement had
“unlawfully created risk of collision” by obstructing Philippine vessels. The Tribunal found that
China’s land reclamation, island building, and allowing of illegal fishing caused severe harm to
the coral reef, and violated China’s obligation to preserve fragile ecosystems (PCA, 2016).
In fact, the Tribunal found that none of the features in the Spratly Islands (in their natural
condition) are capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of their own. In other
words, the geographic features are not considered islands, and do not generate their own EEZ or
CS (Keating, 2018). Swaine (2016) highlights that in no instance did the Philippines explicitly
ask for the tribunal to rule on whether China, the Philippines, or some other state holds or should
hold sovereignty over any of the geological features or maritime zones of the SCS (p. 51). The
argument that UNCLOS has no authority to make such judgements would, in fact, be valid.
Chinese officials and media outlets made abundantly clear that China will “neither accept
nor participate in arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines” (CSIL, 2011). In response
to the Tribunal, Beijing released another White Paper in 2014, restating its position that it did not
accept the arbitration. This 93-paragraph paper insisted the following: the Tribunal lacked
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jurisdiction to determine sovereignty over maritime features, the Philippines had previously
agreed to a settlement, and the subject of the dispute excluded China from compulsory
arbitration; “China believes that the nature and maritime entitlements of certain maritime
features in the SCS cannot be considered in isolation from the issue of sovereignty” (MFA,
2014). However, UNCLOS authorizes arbitral proceedings to continue even if “one of the parties
to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case” (UNCLOS,
1982).
Chinese officials assert that the Tribunal lacks the authority and jurisdiction to arbitrate
this case (MFA, 2014a). Officials have also asserted that Manila had to right to seek third-party
involvement, as it violated international legal norm pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be
kept”) (CCTV, 2016). In fact, Beijing initiated a media campaign to discredit the ruling
immediately after the decision was made. Specifically, it asserts the Tribunal’s “one-sidedness”
and reaffirms its view that the Philippines has illegally occupied Chinese territory (Yang, 2015).
Chinese officials likely expected the Tribunal to reach the ruling that it did, and this campaign
was the most convenient way to embrace the impact it made on their perspective of the disputes.
Strategic Goals and Official Protests
China’s entire economic security is heavily reliant on the SCS (SCS). More than 60
percent of China’s trade (in value) traveling by sea (China Power Project, 2020a). The SCS alone
carries one-third of all global shipping, an estimated $3.37 trillion annually (CFR, 2019). There
is also an estimated 11 billion barrels in oil in the SCS, along with 190 trillion cubic feet in
natural gas resources (CFR, 2019). Over 50% of all fishing vessels are estimated to operate in the
SCS (Poling, 2020). Regional players have an ever-increasing energy dependency has
heightened the stakes for control of these waters. States including China, Taiwan, Malaysia, and
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Vietnam all had record growth rates of energy consumption between 2005-2015 (Dan, 2018).
Without question, control of this area is directly related to the balance of regional economies.
China’s claims to geographic features in the SCS are the most extensive and ambiguous.
Rather than disputing individual features and their adjacent waters, Beijing insists on ownership
of the entirety of the SCS. Chinese officials view these areas as critical to national interests, and
has increasingly attempted to assert its sovereignty over them (Rosenberg, 2010). Chinese
officials first identified the defense of claims in the SCS as a “core interest” in 2010 (U.S. State
Department, 2010). U.S. newspapers announced the developments taken from a private meeting
in Beijing with U.S. officials (Wong, 2011).
…what is considered an internal domestic Chinese issue in Chinese debate may include
territories that others might think are not Chinese at all. Crucially, though, if they are
deemed by China to be in China, then there is no leeway for any discussion or negotiation
with others: territorial integrity is a bottom-line non-negotiable interest (Zeng, Xiao, and
Breslin, 2015, p. 260).
This is critical to understanding Beijing’s approach to the SCS debate, demonstrating that Xi
Jinping himself has placed Chinese core interests as a top priority for the state: “No foreign
country should expect China to trade off with our core national interests… which include
sovereignty, security, and development interests” (People’s Daily, 2013). This overt dedication
to SCS claims highlights the shift in national strategy from a peaceful approach to a more
assertive perspective to achieving its goals.
There has been serious academic debate surrounding just what China’s core interests are
(Campbell, Meick, Hsu, & Murray, 2013). Prior to 2011, Chinese core interests fell under Dai’s
definition: ‘to maintain China’s fundamental system and state security; state sovereignty and
territorial integrity; and the continued stable development of the economy and society’ (Qiang,
2009). China’s Peaceful Development White Paper identifies the six core interests as state
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sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, Constitutional
political system, and safeguards for sustainable economic and social development (Chinese State
Council, 2011). Interpretation of either definition is key, as SCS claims could fall under one or
multiple of the above categories, or none. There has also been debate over whether SCS is a
domestic issue or a foreign policy issue (Zeng, Xiao, and Breslin, 2015). Because the SCS is not
clearly identified in either definition (Chinese State Council, 2011), we must consider official
rhetoric, historic stances, and response to similar disputes as they relate to Chinese core interests.
The Chinese position on the SCS issue can be understood as the following: 1. China does
not participate in the arbitration, nor accept, recognize, or implement the award. 2. China will
adhere to peaceful negotiations and settlements of the SCS dispute. 3. While disputes should be
settled by the parties directly concerned in accordance with the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the SCS, China will work with ASEAN countries to maintain peace and stability in this
region. 4. The temporally established (ad hoc) arbitral tribunal is neither a part of the PCA nor
the ICJ. It does not have jurisdiction over the territorial disputes, which is the core of the
arbitration. The arbitration itself is flawed in procedure. Thus, the award is not legally-binding,
nor representing international law (MFA, 2016; Wang & Chen, 2016).
In May 2009, Beijing submitted a map with nine dashed lines, which based this claim on
historical discovery and use. These maps, first drawn up in the 1940s, are based on historical
evidence from nearly two thousand years ago, which include the Spratly Islands as a part of
Chinese territory. The nine-dash line is a term used by Chinese media to represent their historic
claim to the SCS. The claim is a U-shaped line enclosing most of the waters of the SCS. The
CCP defended its claim and coined the new phrase: “not one [dash] less”. The term was first
officially submitted as evidence in the 2009 dispute with Vietnam. This claim grasps for
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authenticity in historical evidence, such as pottery shards, navigational handbooks, and other
ancient archeological pieces (Beech, 2016). Though the term “nine dash line” was historically
rarely found in Chinese media, it was acknowledged immediately after the PCA Tribunal
(Beech, 2016). In fact, Chinese media referenced the term a record number of times in 2016,
immediately after the tribunal. Specifically, 37% of all references to the nine-dash line by
Chinese media sources took place in 20161.
Chinese media have been critical of foreign media on the SCS issue. In February 2018,
the Global Times cited a Chinese researcher; "Most of the construction on islands in the SCS
were completed in 2015 and the pace then slowed. Civilian facility construction is the major
focus of the SCS islands building and the portion of defense deployment is relatively small”
(Zhao, 2018). This narrative of civil use of the islands is intended to counter external observers’
so-called narratives of China’s military buildup on various islands in the SCS. In fact, the
People’s Daily calls the actions of the Group of Seven (G7) hypocritical and irresponsible:
“These countries have made groundless accusations against China…These countries are in no
position to blame China in the name of international law” (People’s Daily Online, 2018).
Regarding the SCS, we must consider how the maritime disputes fir into China’s overall
diplomatic aims and how they fit into the larger picture. Zhou (2016) finds that the relative
importance of the SCS disputes are fluid, and dependent on military conflict. If China and the
other countries in question were able to shelve the disputes, the issue would slip to a low rank on
China’s foreign policy agenda. However, if the disputes threatened to provoke military conflict,
and thereby to affect the stability of the overall neighborhood environment they would move

Percentage generated by a Factiva search of “nine dash line” by sources originating in China with no date
restriction. 299 out of 794 (37%) took place in 2016. For example, see Wei, 2016; Yang, 2016.
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rapidly up to the top of the Chinese foreign policy agenda (p. 873). Yan (2013) finds that
between 2011 and 2014, Chinese foreign policy transitioned from ‘keeping a low profile’ to
‘striving for achievement’ (pp 15-6), suggesting a change in the status and ranking of SCS
disputes (Zhou, 2016, p. 874).
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Chapter 4: News and the Price of Islands in
China
Nationalism and China’s South China Sea Foreign Policy
Prior to 1990, the public was primarily focused on domestic issues, as China was
undergoing far-reaching economic reforms. However, after 1995, the interest started to shift
towards international issues, along with emerging nationalistic attitudes (Repnikova, 2014). This
shift in Chinese attitude toward its domestic audience may be a response to its increased
occurrences of “mass incidents”. A Chinese sociologist notes that in 2010, there were an
estimated 180,000 demonstrations of social unrest, a three-fold increase from 2003 (Shu, 2012).
Tsang (2019) asserts that Innenpolitk theories best describe this phenomenon (305). Innenpolitik
theories argue that internal factors such as political and economic ideology, national character,
partisan politics, or socioeconomic structure determine how countries behave toward other
countries (Rose, 1998, p. 148). Tsang (2019) narrows his focus on the political system to better
understand this relationship between the CCP and its domestic audience. He asserts a unique
party-state realism for understanding how Chinese policy makers approach foreign policy.
Gries (2002) explores multiple examples of international incidents and how the CCP
modified their narrative to fit the nationalist objective to best support China’s response to each
incident. Regarding information control, however, China is moving away from suppression, and
more toward co-optation (121). In other words, nationalist sentiment is now so engrained into the
Chinese perspective, that it is organically emerging. Popular nationalist movements now allow
the CCP to maintain the “humiliation” narrative with a looser grip on information control (121).
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Similarly, Briscoe (2000) observes the methods the CCP use to promote Chinese culture and
“Chinese dignity” in the international community, as a claim to nationalist identity.
Chubb (2018) addresses the link between public opinion and assertive maritime behavior
in the SCS. He examines nationalist social phenomena that are “capable of generating pressure
for confrontational state actions on issues”, particularly in the SCS and ECS (Chubb, 2018, p.
160). In his examination of three events between 2006 and 2014, he found little evidence to
suggest a link between China’s on-water assertiveness and popular nationalism. One of the three
events he used for analysis is the 2009 U.S. Naval Ship (USNS) Impeccable incident. Chubb
(2019) concludes that because Chinese news sources did not cover the incident within the month
of the incident, that CCP leadership was unconcerned with “nationalist credentials among the
public via the assertive actions it had taken” (167). This conclusion could be discounted if the
approach to which Beijing uses to bolster nationalist credentials is reexamined.
Following the model of domestic public opinion driving foreign policy, Medcalf and
Heinrichs (2011) suggest that assertive Chinese behavior at sea may be “intended as a
demonstration of naval capacity to Chinese audiences, designed to reinforce the status of China’s
leadership and military as defenders of sovereignty” (21). Chubb (2018) examined the
relationship between public opinion and changes to China’s on-water policies between 2006 and
2012, however was unable to find any real causal link (161-174). However, Chubb (2018) notes
that “PRC officials frequently claim to be constrained or pressured by their nationalist citizenry,
but such claims are often either reflexively dismissed or silently accepted, rather than followed
up and discussed in depth” (174).
Lai (2010) notes China’s unique approach to foreign policy, in its centrality of domestic
politics (67-9). In fact, contrary to the pattern of most great powers, consistently the most basic
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driver of Chinese foreign policy is domestic (Tsang, 2020, p. 305). In a 2018 speech addressing
the CCP’s Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, Xi Jinping highlighted the
importance of considering both domestic and international factors while “focusing on realizing
Chinese nation's rejuvenation and promoting human progress” (MFA, 2018). CCP senior
leadership have come to the conclusion “that conducting external work requires taking into
account both domestic and international situations” (MFA, 2018). Xi Jinping concludes be
reasserting that Chinese diplomats must “uphold the authority of the CPC Central Committee as
the overarching principle and strengthen the centralized, uniﬁed leadership of the Party on
external work” (MFA, 2018). Though domestic politics may not overwhelmingly explain
Chinese foreign policy, it most certainly affects foreign policy more than previous theoretical
explanations have assumed.
Security Dilemma
The security dilemma that realism assumes is the ultimate driving factor to states’
decisions, and this is particularly evident in the case of the SCS. The standard realist view is that
China’s growing strength will lead it to pursue its interests more assertively. This increased
assertiveness will lead the U.S. and other regional powers to balance against it. Adherents of the
realist perspective view Chinese increased assertiveness in the SCS and ECS, and alignment of
the U.S., India, and other regional powers as signs that the realist “assertiveness-balancing” cycle
has already begun (Glaser, 2011, p. 81). The “China debate” was most prevalent immediately
following the Cold War. In the early 1990s, the American economy was suffering, as China’s
economy and military spending was growing quickly (Christensen, 2001, p. 6). Christensen
(2001) describes the security dilemma with China simply through realist terms; power is what
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matters, and what matters in power is one’s relative capabilities compared with those of others
(p. 6).
Though outside of the bounds of the SCS issue, the China security dilemma has been
similarly described in this way:
Even if one does not accept the view that the PRC’s goal is to displace the United States
as East Asia’s preponderant power, it is still possible to reach fairly pessimistic
conclusions about the likely future character of the U.S.-China relationship by invoking
the mechanism of the security dilemma. In other words, even if the larger political goals
of both sides are, in some sense, purely defensive, the measures that each takes to secure
its position and achieve its objectives may still arouse alarm and stimulate
countermeasures on the other side. Such processes appear to be at work in several aspects
of contemporary U.S.-China relations. (Friedberg, 2005, p. 22)
Allison (2015) argues the increased likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese conflict, better known
as a “Thucydides trap”. The Thucydides trap is an important metaphor that captures the
application of standard realist understanding of the SCS. This Greek metaphor represents the
attendant dangers when rising power rivals a ruling power; in 12 of 16 cases over the past 500
years, the result was war (Allison, 2015). Xi Jinping himself denies the existence of the concept,
and warned of the dangers of becoming victims of hearsay not based on fact. Curiously, he also
warned that “should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic
miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.” (China Daily, 2015).
It is worth noting that the Thucydides’s trap argument has been criticized by multiple
scholars (Chan, 2020, p. 28-46; Waldron, 2017) for its incompatibility, both from the analytical
and historical perspectives. Allison’s (2015) argument stems from Organski and Kugler’s (1980)
argument addressing the relationship between rising powers and war. However, it takes a stark
deviation from the original argument. The neoclassical realism argument better describes the
security dilemma observed in China’s actions in the SCS. In short, neoclassical realism asserts
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that a state’s actions are a function of domestic politics. Neoclassical realism is the most
appropriate response to the modern factors that influence decision making in China, and serves
as the contemporized version of realist theoretical framing.
The CCP’s use of militant nationalism, its cultivation of historic claims and grievances
against foreign powers, and its rejection of the idea of universal human values are all essential to
its mobilization of popular support and bolstering its legitimacy (Friedberg, 2018, p. 8). As the
CCP is insecure about its legitimacy, its leadership believe that the stronger the country appears
abroad, the stronger the regime will be at home (Friedberg, 2018, p.18). Appeals to patriotism,
nationalism, and cultural pride as a means to legitimize or generate support is by no means
unique to the CCP. However, Joseph (2014) asserts that the CCP’s nationalist appeals,
particularly the “China Dream”, may lead to a more aggressive foreign policy or military policy
in order to enhance its image among its citizens (186).
Assertive or Not? Theories of Assertiveness in South China Sea
Scholars have also theorized that policy adjustments on the part of China since the end of
the 2000s is related to external threat perception. Swaine (2015) found extensive Chinese media
reporting on U.S. activity in East Asia at the end of 2011 and early 2012 (p. 4). Wang and Yin
(2013) found that from 2009 to 2011, the most popular label to describe this renewed U.S.
interest in the region was ‘returning to Asia’. Curiously, ‘pivot to Asia’ received almost no
attention in 2011 and only minor attention in 2012. At the same time, in 2012 ‘strategic
rebalancing to Asia’ was the most popular phrase in the Chinese media for describing the
American policies in the region. However, 2011 saw more than twice as many articles featuring
one of the three labels than any other year (Wang and Yin, 2013, p. 5). The U.S. policy of ‘pivot
to Asia’ has largely been viewed negatively in China, as most sources see the U.S. strategy as
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related to China’s growing power (Chen, 2013; Saunders, 2014; Swaine, 2015; Wang and Yin,
2013; Zhu, 2012).
CSIS’s China Power project identified 53 separate incidents (between 2010 and 2019) in
which Beijing harassed foreign entities in the SCS. The project compiles and codes all incidents
into the following categories according to outcome: arrest, death, harassment, official protest,
ramming, shots fires, standoff, and water cannon. For the purposes of this data, China Power
(2020) defines “harassment” as “aggressive behavior directed at individuals or equipment”.
Actors include the Peoples’ Armed Police (PAP) and the China Coast Guard (which includes
China Maritime Surveillance, China Fisheries Law Enforcement, Maritime Police and Border
Patrol, and Maritime Anti-smuggling Police). China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) is referred to
as China’s “second navy”, which has recently been recognized as the world’s largest blue-water
coast guard fleet (Martinson, 2015). Figure 4.1 illustrates the data collected, with a peak of
harassment events taking place in 2015. This data suggests that Chinese foreign policy became
more assertive, particularly between 2011 and 2016.
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Figure 4.1: Visualization of Harassment Incidents (2010-2019)
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Turcsányi (2018) attempts to explain whether the assertive behavior of China since 2011
has been driven by a power shift (142). His analysis examines the ‘power shift’ theory,
answering whether China only conducted assertive action in the SCS after acquiring the power to
do so. His research examines five established incidents of Chinese assertive action in the SCS:
cable-cutting incidents (2011-2012), the Scarborough Shoal stand-off (2012), The Second
Thomas Shoal stand-off (2013), the oil rig incident (2014), and land reclamation, construction,
and militarization of the SCS outposts (since 2014) (Turcsányi, 2018, p. 143). Ultimately, there
was little evidence to suggest this theory applied to the SCS, as most of the steps which China
took recently were within its capacity for years, and perhaps decades beforehand (Turcsányi,
2018, p. 144).
Of the five assertive actions that Turcsányi (2018) used to conduct analysis of explaining
assertiveness, he found that all but one of these incidents were “reactive assertiveness”.
Turcsányi (2018) asserts that each of the events were simply rational reactive actions taken in
response to an external actor first performing a provocative action (p. 153). He found that in each
of these incidents, the actions of external actors played the role of the immediate trigger for the
Chinese policies. For instance, regarding the cable-cutting incidents, he found this to be ‘reactive
assertiveness’ because other countries were conducting surveys within China’s nine-dash line
(Turcsányi, 2018, p. 153). However, there are flaws in the explanatory evidence he uses to reach
these conclusions. This may be the reasoning that Chinese leaders use to reach their decision, but
it is not an objective account for concluding the event is reactive.
Ratha (2019) argues that China’s assertiveness is the manifestation of its reactions to
other states’ actions, growing nationalistic forces and its utter necessity to acquire natural
resources and safeguard national transportation corridors (8). Chinese assertiveness is often
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assumed and restated without sufficient description and analysis. Little objective analysis has
been conducted on Chinese behavior after 2011, from the perspective of the ‘assertiveness’
concept (Turcsányi, 2018, p. 11). Most analysis discussing Chinese assertiveness to date all
focus on when the actual policy change towards a more assertive Chinese posture allegedly
occurred—2009-2010. Post-2011 assertiveness may not be studied as much because Chinese
policies have become undisputedly assertive since then. In fact, Turcsanyi (2018) found that
China’s assertive behavior in the SCS between 2011 and 2016 unequivocal (43, 53). The
following study counters Johnston’s (2013) interpretation of the effect of Chinese nationalism on
foreign policy since 2010, under Turcsanyi’s definition of ‘prime’ Chinese assertiveness in the
SCS to date.
Methodology for Content Analysis
This content analysis measures the effect of Chinese media on its domestic foreign
audience. Specifically, this study examines Chinese newspaper coverage of five established
assertive incidents in the SCS. Each of the events occurred between 2011 and 2016, immediately
following China’s declaration of the SCS as a national core interest (U.S. State Department,
2010). This research analyzes Xinhua News Agency, China Daily, Global Times, and People’s
Daily, and their framing of the five incidents. The purpose of this research is to explore how
Chinese state media regulates the flow of information following assertive foreign policy actions.
The Factiva database was utilized in order to create an all-inclusive sample of
publications. Factiva is a research tool that aggregates content from thousands of news sources
(Factiva, 2020). Table 4.3 identifies the keywords used to identify related articles about each of
the five events, and specific date ranges used to filter each. Articles that reported on one of the
five events were recorded. Sources headquartered in Hong Kong were included in this data, as
71

scholars have noted a decreasing amount of freedom of media in Hong Kong (Lee & Chan, 2018,
p. 49; Maheshwarl, 2014, p. 190), suggesting the increased role of CCP influence. The date of
publication is also key in understanding how the CCP presents foreign policy information to its
domestic audience. As such, this research also examines the publication date, as it relates to the
date that each event occurred. Of the 99 articles examined, the average news story was published
490 days after the event took place (n=5).
Selected Events
The first of the five actions are the cable-cutting incidents between 2011 and 2012.
During this time period, Chinese vessels cut cables on Vietnamese seismic survey vessels, in an
attempt to continue disrupting its oil-related activities (Hayton, 2014, p. 144, 253). The first case
took place on May 26, 2011, as three Chinese paramilitary ships severed the cable of a
Vietnamese survey ship, with another two similar instances also occurring in 2011. The Vietnam
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011) also reported similar instances in 2011, involving Philippine
and Malaysian research vessels. Similarly, Page (2012) found further cable-cutting incidents in
2012 involving Vietnamese vessels. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denies any
wrongdoing, and found the research vessels as being in grave violation of Chinese sovereignty
and maritime rights (BBC, 2011). Turcsányi (2018) found the incident assertive, as it was
qualitatively different and much bolder than any other policy in the years before (p. 46).
The next incident selected is the Scarborough Shoal standoff of 2012. The incident
occurred on April 10, 2012, when Chinese ﬁshing boats were spotted in the waters by Filipino
reconnaissance planes (Zachrisen 2015, pp. 85–86). The crew of the Philippines’ Gregorio del
Pilar, the biggest warship of its navy, allegedly inspected the boats and discovered protected
maritime species on them. When they tried to arrest the Chinese ﬁshermen, they were prevented
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from doing so by accompanying Chinese surveillance vessels. Alternatively, China claims that
the Chinese ﬁshermen tried to take shelter in the shoal during harsh weather. The Philippine
naval boat blocked the entrance to the lagoon and harassed them. The Chinese surveillance
vessels were then sent to protect the ﬁshermen (China Daily, 2012; People’s Daily Online,
2012).
An important aspect of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff was the increasing pressure
China placed on the Philippines during the incident. China never sent in its military, but the most
advanced and armed law enforcement ships were present. At one point, there were allegedly 90
Chinese vessels facing only two ships of the Philippines (Goldman, 2013, p. 6). What’s more,
China was steadily increasing its diplomatic pressure on the Philippines by repeatedly
summoning its ambassador in Beijing, which was accompanied by editorials mentioning a
potential for war between the countries (China Daily, 2012). The Chinese pressure on the
Philippines can then be regarded as assertive by the number of vessels, the level of diplomatic
and media pressure, and ﬁnally the application of economic sanctions (Turcsányi, 2018, p. 47).
The third selected event is the Second Thomas Shoal incident, which has been ongoing
since 2013. Similar to the Scarborough Shoal incident of 2013, this incident took place near
Mischief Island between China and the Philippines. Since 1999, the Philippines have continually
maintained a presence of marines on the Sierra Madre, a ship run aground. In May 2013,
Chinese fishermen and enforcement vessels blocked the restocking of supplies to the marines on
the Sierra Madre (Glaser and Szalwinski 2013). The controversy surrounding the defense of the
blockade was whether the Philippines were providing reconstruction materials to the Sierra
Madre, in order to prevent its disintegration (Mogato 2015; Tiezzi 2015). The relatively minor
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trigger of the blockade, along with the longevity of the blockade itself, is sufficient to classify it
as assertive (Turcsányi, 2018, p. 47).
On May 2, 2014, China moved the Haiyang Shiyou 981, a commercial oil rig, to the
disputed waters near the Paracel Islands that fell within Vietnam’s EEZ (Bower and Poling
2014). Immediately after, approximately 30 Vietnamese boats tried to intervene, but they were
prevented from doing so by more than 80 vessels of the China Coast Guard. During the
operation, a few Vietnamese personnel were injured and detained. The oil rig remained on the
spot until July 16, 2014, although it was initially scheduled to remain there until 15 August
(Leaf, 2015). China argued that its mission was successfully achieved earlier (Thayer, 2014),
although an alternative explanation was that it was due to an upcoming typhoon (Guardian,
2014). A year later, in 2015, China redeployed the oil rig near the Paracel Islands, although this
time it was within China’s undisputed waters and closer to China’s coast (Panda 2015; see also
SCS Think Tank, 2016).
The oil rig incident is different to the incidents at the Scarborough and Second Thomas
Shoals. The issue was initiated by China, and even though China naturally views its activities as
legitimate, it played some role in its diplomatic, media, and public reactions. China claimed that
it had rights to the waters due to its sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and its EEZ. The
incident was the ﬁrst time that China started drilling oil from disputed waters using an oil rig,
although still not commercially and only on a temporary basis (Thayer, 2014). From this
perspective, it is clear that the Chinese step was unprovoked and markedly different to any
previous behavior of China or any other actor in the region. The Chinese behavior in this case
can be regarded as falling within the scope of the assertive category (Turcsányi, 2018, p. 50).
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The final event encompasses the land reclamation, construction, and militarization of
SCS outposts since 2014. Since 2014, China engaged in massive reclamation projects and the
construction of artificial islands in at least seven locations in the Spratly Islands (Hardy 2014;
Lee 2015a) and at least three locations in the Paracel Islands (Lee 2015b). Based mostly on
satellite imagery and surveillance aircraft pictures, it is possible to have a superb and up to date
description of the Chinese activities (see Lee 2016a; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,
2020). This could prove troublesome for setting date parameters for newspaper content analysis,
but for the purposes of this research, the date the story was covered by multiple global
newspapers will be used (Wong, 2014; Bureaucracy Today, 2014; Hardy, Atkinson, and Hurley
2014; Blanchard, 2014).
Data analysis
War Journalism as the Salient Frame
Following Yang and Heng’s (2018) examination of The Star publications, this research
similarly examines Chinese newspapers’ coverage of established assertive events. Particularly,
this research examines how the newspapers utilize war journalism to frame the official narrative
to the domestic Chinese audience. Galtung (2003) first used the peace/war journalism model to
cover the Gulf War, as a means to describe how journalists focus on asserting a zero-sum
solution (58). Tehranian (2002) advocated for the method, calling peace journalism “a system of
global media ethics”.
War journalism is elite-oriented in its news sourcing practice, whereby leaders and elites
are often given the privilege to define and interpret an event or issue in news stories. War
journalism also focuses on here and now; it only reports about the what, who, where and when of
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a conflict, while neglecting the factors contributing to the problem. This mode of journalism
plays up conflict as an arena where participants are grouped starkly into two opposing sides
(‘them vs. us’). It advocates the fate of “our side”, and only exposes the untruths and perpetrators
of atrocities of the “other side”. Meanwhile, the lies and cover-up attempts of “our side” will be
supported (Tehranian, 2002).
In contrast, peace journalism is a broader, fairer and more accurate way of framing
stories, drawing on the insights of conflict analysis and transformation (Galtung and Fischer,
2013). It is people-oriented in its news sourcing practice; whereby common people are reported
as actors and sources of information in news stories. By taking an advocative and interpretative
approach, peace journalists concentrate on stories that highlight peace initiatives, tone down
ethnic and religious differences and prevent further conflict (Tehranian, 2002). Peace journalism
also reveals the sufferings of all the parties within the conflict, while presenting the invisible
effects of violence such as emotional trauma and damage to social structure (Terzis, 2002; Lynch
& Galtung, 2010). In addition, it also exposes lies, cover-up attempts and culprits on all sides
(Tehranian, 2002).
Lynch and McGoldrick (2007) defined peace journalism as an approach undertaken by
editors and reporters in making choices about what to report and how to report in order to
encourage non-violent responses to conflicts. However, scholars (e.g. Iggers, 1998; Loyn, 2007)
criticized that it is against journalistic principle of objectivity because it expects self-conscious
intervention by journalists. Scholars (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2007; Seow and Maslog, (2005)
found that war/peace journalism is supported theoretically by the framing theory. Entman (1993,
p. 52) defined framing as the process “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem
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definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item
described”. In addition, Lynch and McGoldrick (2007, p. 258) stated that framing refers to the
“construct of a communication – its language, visual and messengers – and the way it signals to
the listener or observer how to interpret and classify new information”. It was also mentioned
that framing means “how messages are encoded with meaning so that they can be efficiently
interpreted in relationship to existing beliefs or ideas” (p. 258).
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Table 4.1: Results for Indicators of War Journalism in Four Chinese Newspapers (Valence)
Percentage (n=99)

Indicators of War Journalism
Elite-Oriented

26.26

Differences-oriented

67.68

Focuses on here and now

32.32

Dichotomizes the good and bad

47.47

Two-party orientation

60.61

Partisan

60.61

Zero-sum orientation

36.36

Uses victimizing/demonizing/emotive language

50.51

Source: Author generated
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Table 4.2: Results for Indicators of Peace Journalism in Four Chinese Newspapers (Valence)
Percentage (n=99)

Indicators of Peace Journalism
People-Oriented

1.01

Reports the areas of agreement

4.04

Reports causes and consequences

29.29

Avoids labeling of good guys and bad guys

13.13

Multiparty orientation

25.25

Nonpartisan

3.03

Win-win orientation

12.12

Avoids victimizing/demonizing/emotive

1.01

language
Source: Author generated
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Indicators of war journalism were decided based on the eight corresponding indicators
outlined in Table 4.1. Each of the 99 articles used in this study were carefully analyzed in order
to identify the presence of features prevalent in one or more of these indicators. In other words,
each article was coded for the eight indicators. Articles that highlighted the individual leaders
involved in the event the article reported on fell into the “elite oriented” category. “Differences
oriented” and “Dichotomizes the good and bad” are similar in that they both consider differences
in perspectives; however, “Differences oriented” articles emphasize the negative effects of the
author’s perspective. “Focuses on here and now” and “Zero-sum orientation” both consider the
event reported relative to the larger situation; however, “Focus on here and now” specifically
omits broader consequences. “Two-party orientation” is also quite similar to “partisan”; both
highlight differing perspectives, but “partisan” articles specifically side with one perspective
over another. Finally, “Uses victimizing/demonizing/emotive language” articles utilize language
that portrays one perspective as the victim of the other.
Among the selected data, examples of peace journalism were prevalent in China Daily
over the other three agencies. China Daily was the most prevalent in reporting on these selected
events, and Global Times generally produced the longest articles, following the expository model
to present a more objective stance. The most prevalent indicators (60%+) recorded among all of
the newspapers were: “Differences oriented”, “Two-party orientation”, and “Partisan”. An article
with “differences oriented” sentiment would include language such as: “If the Vietnamese party
stubbornly persists in its act of man-made vessel collisions with China in China's waters, China
might take some countermeasures based on domestic laws.” (Yang, 2014) “Two-party
orientation” sentiments may include language similar to: “A Chinese oil rig starting its normal
drilling in the waters off China's Xisha Islands on May 2 has been the victim of ceaseless
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forcible and illegal harassments from Vietnamese vessels, although Vietnam has no legal basis to
back up its disruptive and dangerous activities.” (Wu, 2014) Partisan articles included sentiments
such as: “Hanoi should return to its long-held recognition that the Xisha and Nansha islands are
China's territories.” (Wu, 2014). It is worth noting that a single news article can include multiple
indicators or war journalism, as can individual excerpts from an article. In other words, a single
sentence could potentially represent multiple indicators for a single article.
Indicators of peace journalism, outlined in Table 4.2, were also examined. “Peopleoriented” articles emphasize the affect that the reported event has on groups of people, whether
citizens of effected areas, or national citizenry at large. “Reports the area of agreement” and
“Avoids labeling of good guys and bad guys” both use language that emphasize similarities, but
the latter specifically avoids righteousness or a preferred perspective. “Reports causes and
consequences”, “Win-win” and “Multiparty orientation” both consider the reported event as it
relates to the larger situation, but the latter two types specifically identify multiple outcomes or
solutions to the reported disputes or problems. “Win-win” articles also report on multiple
potential solutions to the problem. “Nonpartisan” and “Avoids victimizing/demonizing/emotive
language” generally both follow an objective reporting style, and do not pit perspectives against
each other, nor identify a “winner” or “loser” in disputes or problems.
Among the same selected data, peace journalism was significantly less observed. The
most prevalent indicators of peace journalism (25%+) were “multiparty orientation” and “reports
causes and consequences”. An article that includes sentiments of multiparty orientation may
include language similar to: “According to the provisions of the Convention, state parties shall
settle any dispute between them by peaceful means according to the UN Charter, and when a
dispute arises, the parties should proceed expeditiously to exchange views on a settlement
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through negotiations or other peaceful means.” (Jin, 2014). Articles with sentiments of “reports
causes and consequences” may include rhetoric such as: If China is able to provide this
[peaceful] reassurance, this would go a long way in reconciling existing differences over the
SCS, especially with Vietnam and the Philippines” (Ho & Supriyanto, 2012). It is worth noting
that indicators of peace journalism do not necessarily represent objective reporting, rather solely
the presence of journalism framing that is “broader, fairer, and more accurate”, as it inherently
“draws on the insights of conflict…” (Galtung and Fischer, 2013, pp. 95-102).
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Table 4.3: Average Date of Publication Following Five Assertive Events (Visibility)
Event

Key word search

Cable Cutting,

Vietnam and cable

May 26, 2011-2012

and ship

Scarborough Shoal,

Scarborough shoal

Date range of

Average Date of

results

Publication

2011-2013

5/24/2012
(363 days after)

2012-2016

Apr-Jun 2012

1/12/2014
(~800 days after)

Second Thomas Shoal,

Second Thomas

May 2013-

shoal

CCPC Oil Rig,

(oil rig) and

May 2014

(Vietnam) not

2013-2016

12/18/2014
(~575 days after)

2014-2016

9/30/2014
(~140 days after)

(riot*)
Land Reclamation,

land reclamation and 2015-2017

12/10/2015

2014-

South China Sea and

(~575 days after)

dispute
Source: Author generated 2

Calculated averages with approximated results are based on the first indicator that event
occurred.

2

83

After careful analysis of 99 newspaper articles of the above five events, certain framing
patterns were identified. Table 4.3 correlates the date of the event with the average date of
newspaper publication following the event. The average length of time between assertive events
and publication is 490 days. Broad key word searches were utilized in order to ensure a breadth
of articles that reported on the intended event. Articles that included one or more of the key
words within the search were selected, except for those that only mentioned the key words
without reporting on the intended event. The “Date range of results” column reveals the date
range, but is only descriptive. The search itself actually included any article between 2011-2016.
The data range column was necessary because the events took place within multiple ranges of
the larger “assertive time period”.
Manaheim (1994) identifies visibility of coverage as one of the three aspects of news
framing analysis (the others being valence and frame genres). Visibility refers to the amount of
coverage and the prominence level of an event covered in the news (Manaheim, 1994). Galtung
(2003) contends that proper monitoring of peace journalism should include quality, quantity, and
the extent to which it reaches the reader (p.179). The latter of these three data points is addressed
through visibility for the purposes of this research. Regarding visibility following the certain
assertive incidents, CCP media may have a pattern in [lack of] coverage. Chubb (2018) notes
that following the 2009 USNS Impeccable incident, there was no television coverage, nor MFA
press conferences that even mention the event took place for more than 20 days following the
event (167).
Particular to this analysis, newspaper visibility highlights the careful consideration that
state media takes in formulating the official narrative. As the Chinese domestic audience is the
intended target, newspaper agencies are careful to craft a message that strengthens the public’s
84

support of the assertive events. In short, they don’t have to report right away. There is little
outside influence or available information, meaning newspapers are not advantaged to publish
stories immediately after the event. Table 4.3 shows clear indications of state media withholding
stories regarding assertive events, though there is evidence of some newspapers publishing
sooner than the average. It can be concluded that this delay in available information contributes
to the creation and alignment of official narratives, likely to maintain popular favor of assertive
foreign policies.
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Chapter 5: Outlook and Implications in
South China Sea
Addressing Expected Findings
1. Increased domestic intellectual constraints affect adaptation of foreign policy (Zhao, 1997).
Multiple scholars have noted the relationship between the specialized development of
nationalism in China with the push to a more assertive foreign policies (Hughes, 2006; Shirk,
2008; Amir, 2014). “China’s extensive sovereignty claims derive not from legal and historical
claims, but from the nationalist desires that have increased greatly over the past few decades.”
(Amir, 2014, p. 3). Shen (2007) asserts that the proliferation of nationalist expression “will
potentially become a stabilizing force for China’s external relations” (p. 199). Rasmussen (2015)
finds that nationalistic responses typically accompany military action (p. 5). Miller (2013)
explores the concept of rising power sentiments of “being wronged by the empire”, as it relates
to its frame in the domestic narrative. It is key to distinguish the unique position the CCP holds
regarding the overwhelming control of domestic access to information. This total control ensures
that the narrative it formulates through state media is the only information that the domestic base
has access to in forming opinions.
In a study of the effects of Chinese Nationalism on foreign policy, Duan (2017)
reconsiders the popular narratives that Chinese nationalism fuels external assertiveness.
Specifically, with four points: Firstly, Chinese nationalism is not simply an elite instrument, but
has deeply political, historical, cultural and external origins. Secondly, without a benchmark for
comparison or a systematic empirical study, the image that nationalism is ‘on the rise’ is
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imprecise and only intuitively plausible. The normative and empirical analysis reveals a simply
fact that not all Chinese are nationalists, and some dislike nationalism, especially extreme
nationalism. Thirdly, even though nationalists’ voices online and in media are challenging
Beijing’s monopoly of power in framing foreign policies, the CCP still keeps nationalism in
check: ‘If we still have little agreement over what Chinese nationalism is, it is next to impossible
to use such a contested object to explain any particular foreign policy outcome’ (Carlson, 2009,
p. 26). Lastly, it is unclear how influential nationalism is in foreign-policy arenas owing to the
concept’s vagueness and fallacies in the reasoning (pp. 899-900).
In response to Duan’s (2017) concerns, this research challenges these findings. First, for
the purposes of this study, whether Chinese nationalism is elite is not relevant. It is evident that
Chinese nationalism is founded in deeply rooted historic contexts, but there is nonetheless no
question of its existence. Next, the plausibility of the rise of Chinese nationalism, as a
comparison to other periods is evident in the timeframe selected for this study, 2011-2016. This
period saw unprecedented examples of assertive foreign policies in the SCS, as evidenced in
Table 4.3. This narrow window alone represents a change to Chinese foreign policy, a change
made possible by the tight grip on domestic access to information. Third, Carlson’s (2009)
concerns regarding the Chinese definition of nationalism do not inherently prevent analysis on its
effects. In fact, we have a better understanding of its deep roots in Chinese politics and culture
because of the assertion. Finally, the newspaper content analysis conducted in Tables 4.1 and 4.2
evidences the heavy weight that Beijing assigns to nationalist rhetoric.
2. Realism best explains foreign policy aggressiveness.
The relationship between newly assertive foreign policies (2011-2016) and media
framing only further highlights the assertion that Chinese actions are driven by offensive motives
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to balance regional power in China’s favor. However, it is worth noting that a specific variant of
realism was found as a better explanation for these newly assertive events. Neoclassical realism
addresses the domestic factors contributing to assertive foreign policies, while still retaining the
essence of realist framework. In other words, neoclassical realism better accounts for the
variables observed in this case. In this sense, it can be reasonably applied to similar cases with
domestic constraints.
This research has demonstrated an increased assertive foreign policy, specific to the SCS,
starting in 2011. However, Johnston (2013) argues that assertiveness in China is neither new nor
assertive. He identifies four main causal arguments for China’s new assertiveness in 2010:
change in the distribution of power, rising Chinese nationalism, politics of leadership transition,
and the power of the PLA (p. 35).
Even if there had been a steep jump in nationalism in 2009, for it to have a causal effect
one would have to demonstrate how and why in 2010 Chinese leaders decided to take
rising nationalism into greater account when making foreign policy decisions. Proponents
of the nationalism argument offer no theory about how popular sentiments are translated
into foreign policy. The explanation makes an assumption about the hypersensitivity of
the top leadership to nationalist public opinion for which there is almost no systematic
evidence as yet. In a political system where there are no electoral costs to ignoring public
opinion, it is unclear why China’s authoritarian leaders would care much about public
views. Nor is it clear that China’s top leaders would want public opinion to matter on
strategically important questions—they prefer maneuverability, not constraint. (Johnston,
2013, p. 37)
Multiple scholars contend that Beijing will become more cooperative as it increases
relative power and becomes more integrate into the global system (Friedberg, 2005; Christensen,
2006). In fact, Scobell and Harold, (2013) have dubbed this explanation as “premature
triumphalism” (112). This explanation for assertiveness is a response to the 2008 recession,
which represented a shift in world power. The theory is that China began acting far more
assertively to fill the apparent power vacuum (Scobell and Harold, 2013, p. 112; Nye, 2011).
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Alternatively, the assertive actions can also be explained as a defensive action taken as a
response to U.S. moves in the region. Specifically, US actions to reinforce its commitment to the
Asia-Paciﬁc (FON operations, UNCLOS, and other ally commitments) played to China’s
underlying feelings of weakness and vulnerability. In this sense, Beijing’s “assertive” actions are
better described as reactions, as Scobell and Harold (2013) named, “reactive insecurity” (112).
Alternatively, my research supports the claim that China’s actions are offensive by
nature. The war journalism framing of assertive events signals a calculated, strategic effort to
manipulate domestic opinion. As this is what Beijing relies on for legitimacy, further assertive
foreign policy can be reasonably expected to follow. What’s more, China’s disputes in the SCS
are not challenges to U.S. territory. This fact alone suggests that it cannot be inherently
defensive. In fact, China’s recent economic development and military advances have elevated
China’s status a global superpower (Brands & Sullivan, 2020). Because the SCS disputes are
between China and relatively smaller countries (both geographically and in terms of soft power),
China is able to continue its assertive foreign policies in the region without any real recourse.
This scenario perfectly describes the realist model. Ratha (2019) offers that though China’s
assertiveness may not be new, but it is newly overt: “In front of cameras, the Chinese are
friendly and favorably disposed but underneath, they try to divide the South Asian countries by
putting huge pressure on them” (10).
Outside of competing state governments, another challenge that the CCP faces in its
maritime disputes comes from international organizations. Legitimate challenges to international
law and international norms from both ASEAN and the UN present a threat to China’s
favorability in the international community. But, more importantly to the CCP, these challenges
have the potential to damage its domestic reputation. Given China’s unique relationship with its
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citizenry (Tsang, 2019), it cannot afford to lose favor with its domestic base, especially regarding
of national pride and perceived international ranking. Nye (2011) observes that, even though
economic hardships (2008 recession), the CCP was able to project a strong power assessment
among the Chinese people. This has likely contributed to the more assertive foreign policy shift
since 2009 (Nye, 2011).
In a study of Chinese IR scholars’ attitudes to international relations, Feng and He (2014)
found that Chinese assertiveness is driven by a reaction to U.S. policies (14). The author
contends that Chinese leaders are more likely to choose assertive policies as a response, which is
independent of China’s rise in power (Feng & He, 2014, p. 14). In fact, Ross (2012) interprets
the U.S. pivot to China as explicitly targeting China’s growth, development, and influence in the
region (70-82). However, these analyses do not account for the relationship between media
framing and newly assertive foreign policies. Because the U.S., China’s only relative power
competition, is practicing only FON exercises (inherently non-offensive), and has not taken sides
on territorial disputes, Chinese actions cannot be considered “reactive” or “defensive”.
Relative to the region, the U.S. presence in the SCS is the glaring world superpower that
presents a real challenge to the Chinese power balance. U.S. freedom of navigation maneuvers,
strictly following UNCLOS rulings, along with key allies and basing in the area, make up the
largest military threat that China faces in the region. However, China still has a long way to go to
catch up to the U.S. regarding military, economic, and other soft-power resources (Nye, 2011).
Even economically, the U.S. far surpasses that of China, and far from posing any real challenge
to the U.S. (Nye, 2011). Following the realist model, U.S. presence in the SCS is the only factor
preventing further assertive action, such as total occupation of disputed islands.
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3. China frames newspaper content in a way that positively reflects its zero-sum solution to SCS
disputes. The framing of nationally sensitive issues is strictly controlled, as the CCP sends
notices to all the newsrooms, gives direction on framing, and orders reprint articles from party
mouthpieces (Kuang, 2014). Kuang and Wei (2018) find that the autonomy of the news
organizations in non-democracies, such as China, to frame political issues largely depends on the
geographic relevance of the issue due to the scope of the control exerted by the propaganda
authorities.
The data analysis of this thesis highlights how China utilizes its overwhelming control of
available information to maintain positive popular sentiment regarding its assertive foreign
policies. Particularly, the CCP’s stronghold over available newspaper outlets has proved to be
one of the predominant ways in which it upholds this popular sentiment. The extensive use of the
war journalism frame, as evidenced in Table 4.1, underlines the method by which the CCP
defines and interprets assertive events in the SCS. War journalism is inherently a subjective
method of reporting, yet another example of the role that information control plays in rallying
support otherwise questionable CCP policies.
The presence of war journalism indicators within Table 4.1 further evidence China’s war
focus in media production. This media frame is particularly alarming, given its inherent goal of
polarization and escalation (Galtung, 2003, p. 179). Though alarming, it is not surprising, as
Chinese legitimacy and justification for assertive policies relies on the support of its domestic
base. Alternatively, peace journalism “stands for truth as opposed to propaganda and lies”
(Galtung, 2002, p.179), which was evidenced in a relatively significantly lower number of
newspapers (see Table 4.2).
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Outlook
The framework for this thesis research was modeled on Fong and Heng’s analysis of the
SCS dispute through the perspective of a Malaysian newspaper’s framing strategies. The study
found that Malaysian officials often highlighted to other ASEAN states their preferred solution
(e.g. action vs. non-action) (31). At the same time, Kreuzer (2016) found that Philippine
newspapers were simultaneously attempting the opposite, by highlighting Chinese assertiveness
to its readers (239-276). This underlines the importance of understanding how state media
controls fit into the larger picture of narrative formation. However, it can be concluded that
external factors will have a relatively low impact on China’s domestic audience, as there is
virtually no alternative information available. Further research should also be conducted to
measure the effectiveness of Chinese information control. A survey of regular readers, rather
than Chinese IR scholars, may be more influential on domestic audience response. This study
demonstrates the role that Chinese newspapers take in formulating available information, but the
effect frames have on domestic opinion may offer more utility in prescribing theoretic
explanations
We must also consider similar dispute cases in order to better understand how they fit
into Chinese core interests and policy goals. For example, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have been
disputed between China and Japan since the 1970s. In 2012, the Japanese government purchased
three of the Senkaku Islands from private citizens. Subsequently, the Japanese Coast Guard
recorded a dramatic increase in the number of Chinese vessels into the contiguous zone and
territorial seas of the Senkaku Islands (Japanese MFA, 2020). Though these cases do not solidify
which of the 5 core interests island disputes fall under, it does highlight the importance these
disputes hold among Chinese leadership. Similarly, the stability of the Korean peninsula could
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also be considered a core interest as it relates to national security and economic development.
Though there is little evidence of overt Chinese assertiveness regarding Korea, Xinchun (2010)
argues that “the stability and development of the Korean peninsula directly relate to China’s core
interests” (Xinchun, 2010).
Finally, further research would be served well to examine the distinction between
war/peace journalism among both democracies and authoritarian states. Addressing the presence
of war journalism in democracies, and what separates them from authoritarian states, may serve
to apply to a wider, global security dilemma. Alternatively, research conducted on the level of
information control compared to the effectiveness of media framing would be useful; identifying
authoritarian states that do not have a presence of war journalism may uncover alternative
methods of domestic-level framing of international events.
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